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The purpose of this study was threefold: (1) to test the 
exi s ting theory which explains inflation as a result of its self-
generating nature; (2) to investigate the contribution of foreign 
trade upon inflation; and (3) to test the causal relationship between 
the rate of inflation and the deficit. A system of four equations has 
been used to explain the relationsh i p between the price level and the 
monetary expansion, between the rate of growth of the monetary base 
and the rate of the monetary expansion, the deficit and the monetary 
base, and, finally, between the deficit and the price level. As the 
existing model was exposed to open economy assumptions by introducing 
foreign reserves as another source of variation of monetary base, the 
explanatory power of the model increased. That is, as the results 
suggest, explaining the inflation/defic i t chain in t he context of 
cl osed economy assumption leaves much of the process unexplained. 
Even though part of the increase i n the monetary base i s caused by 
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forei gn trade, a major portion of the expansion in monetary base is 
caused by the deficit. That is, a government ' s expenditure exceeds 
its revenue in any given year, whi ch results in financing that deficit 
through borrowing from the central bank--that is, monetizing the 
deficit. 
This study suggests that no generality can be made regarding 
countries, the the source of inflation in Latin America . 
source of inflation is only the defi cit, 
foreign reserves. In most, both factors 
In some 
while in others it is only 
contribute . Furthermore , 
when both foreign reserves and deficit contribute to the rate of 
inflation simultaneously , the effect of foreign reserves is less 
expansionary. This can be seen from the magnitude of the respective 
parameter estimates . 
In the last part of the study, the Granger test of causality 
has been used to test the causal relationship between the price level 
and the deficit. Again, countries exhibit heterogeneous results. In 
some, inflation apparently causes the deficit, while in others, the 
deficit is the cause of inflation. In several countries , strong 
feedbac k exists between these two variables. As a result, it can be 
concluded that the extent and sources of inflation for countries under 
study are different. 
In conclusion, a few policies are suggested which could be used 
to bring both deficits and inflation at least to some acceptable 
level . 
(96 pages ) 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTI ON 
High on the list of Latin America ' s problems stands inf l ation . 
As elsewhere in the world, inflation in Latin America has largely 
resulted from increases in money and credit touched off by government 
budgetary deficits , without a corresponding rise in production of 
goods and services . The defi cits occur when governments spend in 
excess of thei r revenues . Inflation tends to be self-perpetuat i ng . 
It feeds on itself . As prices go up, the pu rchasing power of money 
goes down . When i nf l ation gets under way, the public soon takes for 
granted that the trend wi l l continue. Confidence in money as a store 
of value waves . A sear ch for hedges against i nflation begins . Common 
stocks , real estate , and commodities are the hedges most frequently 
resorted to. Businessmen convert cash balances into inventory. These 
purchases drive prices up even faster . There is a strong corre l ation 
between the degree of inflation and the degree of government interven-
t ion in the market . Fi sca l deficits have l ong been referred to as the 
principal engine of infl ation i n La tin America . The ever- i ncreasing 
government deficits are, in large measure, a consequence of the infla-
tion itself and the lack of flexibility of government revenues . A 
large portion of the taxes in these countries are excise and import 
taxes , many of which do not rise in proportion to the increase in 
prices . Income taxes ri se more or less in line with prices and money 
incomes; but income taxes account for a minor fraction of Latin Ameri-
can government ' s revenues , and few of them are collected currently so 
that this year ' s tax receipts are based on last year's incomes , with 
an inevitable lag between revenue and government expenditures . 
In spite of an abundance of literature on inflation, there have 
been few attempts to analyze the relationship between fiscal deficits 
and inflation. Furthermore, almost all studies are based on a closed 
economy assumption and no study whatsoever ( at least to the knowledge 
of the present researcher) has been done to analyze this phenomenon in 
the context of an open economy. This study attempts to fill this gap 
by empirically testing the level of contribution of foreign trade on 
the money supply and the price level. 
A substantial portion of government expenditures in the high 
inflation countries goes for subsidies to state enterprises such as 
electric power and transportation companies. There is also the desire 
to increase the real vo lume of government expenditure each year so as 
to both meet the demand for social services such as education and 
increase the level of investment in the public sector which accounts 
for a substantial proportion of the total inves tment in Latin America. 
Perhaps the most important underlying cause of inflation in Latin 
America lies in the tendency on the part of Latin America's govern-
ments to make monetary policy a more or less complete servant of their 
political policy; that is, monetizing deficits by government borrowing 
from the central bank. Monetizing deficit refers to the practice of 
printing money by a country's treasury against bonds issued by it s own 
government and sold to its own central ban k to finance a budget 
deficit . 
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The other factor that accounts for the growth of the money 
supply and, as a result, the growth of the general price level is 
foreign exchange reserves. Accumulation of foreign exchange reserves 
as a result of balance-of-payments surplus could be considered another 
source of inflation (Oiz 1970) . The debate over the cause and conse-
quences of inflation in Latin America has largel y invol ved two groups 
called "structuralists" and "monetarists." Campos (1967) argues that 
structuralists, if in power, would have to adopt monetarist policies 
as a short-run meas ure and that monetarists would, in the long run, 
accept the primacy of structural change. The monetarist is a "struc-
turalist in a hurry" and the structuralist is a "monetarist without 
policy-making responsibility" (Campos 1967, pp. 108-9 ) . 
The "structuralist" argument is that inflation is inevitable in 
an economy that is attempting to achieve rapid growth in the presence 
of structural bottlenecks and constraints which are generally taken to 
be: (a) the inelastic supply of foodstuffs ; (b) the foreign exchange 
bottleneck; and (c) the financial constraints . The Latin American 
"monetari st" analysis of inflation is relatively straightforward. 
Inflation, according to the monetarist view, originates in and is 
maintained by expansionist monetary and fiscal polic ies comprised of 
government deficit spending (coupled with the operation of the ineffi-
cie nt state enterprises and economic pricing policies), expansionist 
credit policies, and the expansionary exchange operations of central 
banks. 
It is important to note that the "monetarists" do not deny the 
existence of "structural rigidities and bottlenecks" in le ss-developed 
countr ies , but they argue that such bottlenecks are not in fact 
"structural" or "autonomous" in nature. They result from the price 
and exchange rate distributions which are generated by inflation 
itself and by government attempts to reduce the rate of price 
increases. They argue that bottlenecks wil l be eliminated when infla-
tion is brought under control . Furthermore, with a su itabl y reformed 
tax structure and with less inflation and perhaps less government 
intervention, the private sector would be able to play a larger role 
in the deve lopment process , thus reducing the need for government 
deficit financing . 
The controversy between these two schools of thought reveals 
its track even among contemporary economists in their attempts to 
tackle the problem of inflation in less-developed countries. The 
studies by Edel ( 1969), Kahil (1973), Harberger (1963), Diaz-Alejandro 
(1965) , Diz (1970) , Dutton (1971) , Voge l (1974), and Aghevli and Khan 
(1977) attempt to analyze the inflation phenomenon and its sources and 
consequences . 
Perhaps the study by Harberger (1963) of the inflation in Chile 
has been the most influential empirical analysis of inflation in the 
monetarist tradition in Latin America; and subsequent econometric 
studies by Diaz-Alejandro (1965) , Diz ( 1970), and Vogel ( 1974 ) are 
extensions of the basic Harberger model. 
Harberger's ( 1963 ) study of Chilean inflation covers the period 
from 1939 to 1958, during which time inflation was almost continuous 
and the wholesale price index and the cost of li ving index increased 
more than eightfold. The approach is basically a monetarist one , and 
Harberger tests the hypothesis of a stab le demand function for real 
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balances by regressing the annual rate of price change in the cost of 
living index upon the percentage change in the money supply during the 
present year and the preceding year and the percentage change in real 
income during the present year. 
The empirical results obtained by Harberger would appear to 
support the monetarist interpretation with each of the monetary vari-
ables statistically significant and the inclusion of the wages vari-
able failing to increase the overall explanatory power of the monetary 
variables . 
As previously mentioned, the studies by Oiaz-Alejandro (1965), 
Diz (1970) , and Vogel (1974) are extensions of the basic Harberger 
mode l and , therefore , requires less detailed discussion . In his study 
of Argentina , Oiaz-A l ejandro regresses various indices of inflation on 
four independent variables--money supply, real gross domestic product 
plus merchandise imports , hourly money wage rates in industry, and 
exchange rate . He finds that changes in wage rates are highly corre-
lated with subsequent changes in money supply, while changes in money 
supply do not appear to have a significant influence on subsequent 
changes in wage rates. He argues that the high rates of inflation 
combined with the fa l l in real national product that occurred in 
severa l periods reflect the existence of cost-push inflation so that 
the monetary authority is faced with increasing unemployment if it 
does not permit the money supply to grow in response to increases in 
wage rates. 
The study by Oiz (1970) also examines the experience of Argen-
tina covering the period 1935-62. Two dependent variables used are 
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wholesale price and cost of living indices, and the independent vari-
ables used are: money supply , real income, an index of nominal wages, 
the official exchange rate, and a measure of price expectations. In 
the regression results, the money supply , real income, and expectation 
coefficients are statistically significant and exhibit the expected 
sign. The wage coefficients are not significant, and the exchange 
rate coefficients, although significant, s uggest a highly inelastic 
response of prices to change in the exchange rate . Diz interprets his 
findings that changes in the money supply have a substantial impact on 
the rate of inflation as evidence in support of the "monetarist" 
analysis of inflation. 
Vogel ( 1974) has extended the Harberger model to sixteen Latin 
American countries for the period 1950-69 . The dependent variab l e is 
the consumer price index, and the independent variables are money 
supply, real income , and past percentage changes in the rate of infla-
tion. All variables are annual and are expressed as percentage 
changes . "Structural" variables, such as wage changes and exchange 
rate changes, are not included in the analysis . The paper reports the 
results obtained from using pooled data exhibited a high level of 
overall explanatory power, and the coefficients of independent vari-
ables exhibit the correct s ign. The results of individual country 
regression were less favorable, and they revealed considerable differ-
ences between countries . 
Studies by Lovell (1963) , Dutton ( 1971 ) , and Aghevli and Khan 
(1977) regarded money supply as an endogenous variable, a function of 
a government's deficit. As the pioneer of such studies, Lovell states 
that once it is decided that a given share of real government spending 
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will be financed by deficit, both the real and nominal money supply 
must be regarded as endogenous variables. Dutton (1971) , in treating 
money supply as an endogenous variable, reasons that since money 
supply is related to fiscal deficit , it cannot be an exogenous vari-
able. Aghevli and Khan (1977) state that the expansion in the nominal 
stock of money increases the demand for goods and services and thus 
prices but results in increased government deficits which the authori-
ties finance by further money creation. They developed a dynami c 
model of inflation based on the idea that the rate of inflation tends 
to increase nominal expenditure faster than revenue. The resultant 
budget deficit increases the money supply and induces further infla-
tionary pressures . 
There also have been studies regarding the welfare cost of 
inflationary finance in which inflation is regarded as a tax which 
falls on holders of real cash balances. During i nflationary periods, 
holders of cash balances will try to reduce their portfolio and ex-
change their cash for goods in kind in order to avoid depreciation of 
their holdings. Baily (1956) defines this cost as the area under the 
demand curve for real cash balances , which measures the cost in loss 
of convenience . He states that even if i nflation is fully antici-
pated , the time cost of exchanging money for goods and barter arrange-
ments still exist. Friedman (1969), regarding this cost, states that 
the only long-run welfare effect of inflation is a loss in the overall 
efficiency of the economy resulting from individuals and firms econ-
omizing on money balances to hedge against inflation . 
This study is divided into two main parts. First, empirica l 
tests regarding the applicability of Dutton's (1971) model to various 
Latin American countries are conducted; and second, Dutton's mode l is 
extended by introducing the foreign sector in order to capture the 
effect of openness of the economy on the generation of inflation . 
Ch apter II presents a brief description of the macroeconomic 
variables that have been used in the empirical study; Chapters III and 
IV give the basic theoretical framework and results of empirical work 
for c losed and open economy assumptions, respectivel y. Chapter V 
notes the main implications of this study and will give suggestions 
regarding the elimination of the inflation deficit chain . 
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CHAPTER II 
DESCRIPTION OF SOME MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES 
The data base of the empirical part of this study is provided 
by a set of macroeconomic variables, including money supply, net 
foreign assets, monetary base, gross domestic product, price level, 
and domestic credit component of the monetary base for the period of 
1950-80. A description of the data provides a general picture of the 
performance of the economy at the main level for the period under 
study. Most of the data that are used in the empirical study ha ve 
been taken from yearbooks by the International Monetary Fund (1981). 
The period of coverage has been chosen on the basis of the availa-
bility of a set of homogeneous data. 
Money, Income, and Prices 
There are several theoretical definitions of money. The defi-
nition most commonly used is that which describes money as a medium of 
exchange, and it includes currency with the people and demand deposits 
in banks. A second common definition describes money as an asset and 
includes money in the narrow sense plus time deposits in banks. 
For the purpose of this study , money defined narrowly (M 1) has 
been chosen as the money supply of a country. 
countries under study are shown in Table 1. 
rency of the countries. 
Money supplies for all 
Table 2 names the cur-
TABLE 1 
MONEY STOCK (M1) IN MILLIONS OF RESPECTIVE COUNTRY'S CURRENCY 
Ba l i- Col om- Costa Dominican Ecua- El Sal- Guate- Hon-
Year Argentina via Brazil bia Rica Republic dor vader mala duras Venezuela 
---------· 
1950 200 5 80 900 204 41 . 8 913 128. 7 58. 9 38.5 1576 
1951 200 6 90 1200 224 53. 1 845 136 . 2 60 . 4 47 . 5 1646 
1952 400 9 100 1320 265 62 . 1 1051 163 . 7 63 . 6 52.5 1909 
1953 400 16 120 1550 291 60 . 2 1088 171.8 76 .1 59.4 2085 
1954 500 27 150 1840 325 68 . 6 1273 190 . 4 77 . 6 68 . 6 2169 
1955 600 56 180 1910 340 76 . 5 1193 184. 4 86.7 60.6 2414 
1956 700 197 220 2380 342 76 . 9 1358 215 . 0 103 . 9 67.2 2756 
1957 800 291 290 2700 370 84 . 4 1412 215 . 2 116.3 64 . 3 3649 
1958 1200 301 350 3260 399 107 . 2 1400 202 . 3 106.8 63 . 0 4017 
1959 1700 386 500 3630 427 91. 9 1577 205 . 7 108. 8 65.9 3823 
1960 2200 419 690 3980 433 101 . 9 1732 193 . 0 105.5 64.3 3574 
1961 2400 496 1040 4960 422 104 . 4 1778 192. 5 106 . 7 65 . 7 3684 
1962 2500 556 1690 5930 480 114 . 0 2000 192. 1 108. 7 72 . 7 3604 
1963 3200 665 2780 6690 535 130.2 2241 231 . 2 121 . 4 79 . 1 3840 
1964 4600 803 5130 8250 568 116 . 6 2626 243 . 6 129 . 3 89 . 8 4399 
1965 5900 943 9050 9640 598 135 . 0 2670 250 . 3 135. 6 104 . 6 4858 
1966 7900 1153 10480 11240 622 116 . 1 3016 259 . 0 143.0 106 . 9 5012 
1967 10900 1192 14950 13680 832 123.7 3439 264.2 148. 3 120.6 5632 
1968 13600 1287 21300 15860 890 147 . 0 417 2 281.6 160.1 135. 0 6117 
1969 12100 1361 27410 19400 1020 153.8 4751 305.6 169 . 5 156 . 6 6724 
0 
TABLE 1--Continued 
Boli- Col om- Costa Dominican Ecua- El Sa l- Guate- Hon-
Year Argentina via Brazil bia Rica Republic dor vador mala duras Venezuela 
--------- ------- -------
1970 14500 1532 34740 22400 1103 177.6 5989 316 . 9 182.8 165.9 7223 
1971 19700 1760 44910 25060 1423 198.5 6719 345.1 186.6 177.8 8425 
1972 32900 2210 62890 31850 1624 230 . 5 8376 411.6 222.8 212.4 10077 
1973 71400 2969 93780 41650 2020 273 . 5 11299 496.7 276.7 255. 1 12066 
1974 120400 4257 125330 49070 2480 377.9 16866 598.2 320.7 252.7 17333 
1975 341900 4759 174510 58920 2988 399.5 18343 712.1 374. 1 280.4 26056 
1976 1373100 6497 241710 79380 3895 402.6 24376 1001. 5 527.2 388.1 29584 
1977 3216700 7855 330290 103500 4844 475.0 30196 1099.8 667.8 443.0 37093 
1978 7484000 8831 465620 133850 6007 495.9 33171 1194.1 739 .3 534.5 42889 
1979 18545000 10304 799810 166630 6632 643.3 42213 1429.6 843.3 597.6 46901 
1980 36158000 14812 1369280 213150 7761 660.6 54143 1568. 2 855.2 645.5 54488 
----- --------------
SOURC E: Compiled from International Monetary Fund. 1982. International Financial Stat is-
tics Yearbook. Washington, D.C. 
Note: See Table 2, page 12, for currency of respective country. 
TABLE 2 
TERMS FOR MONETARY UNITS USED IN 
COUNTRIES UNDER STUDY 
Country 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Sa lvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Venezuela 
Currency 
Peso 
Peso 
Cruzeiro 
Peso 
Co lon 
Peso 
Sucre 
Colon 
Quetza 1 
Lempira 
Bolivar 
For all countries under study, two price indices are con-
structed , the wholesale price index and the consumer price index. 
During the period under study, the base year and weight system were 
changed severa 1 times . The International Monetary Fund has con-
structed a consistent set of price index numbers for the whole period 
with 1975 as the base year. For the purpose of this study , the IMF-
constructed index numbers have been used. Consumer price index for 
all countries under study for the period 1950-80 are shown in Table 3. 
Gross domestic product in real terms based on 1975 prices is 
shown in Table 4. Tables 5, 6, and 7 give a summary description of 
the average annual growth rates of money, prices, and income, respec-
tively, calculated on the basis of data presented in Tables 1, 3, 
and 4. 
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TABLE 3 
CCNSUMER PRICE INDEX (1975 = 100) * 
Bali- Col om- Costa Dominican Ecua- El Sal- Guate- Han-
Year Argentina via Brazil bia Rica Republic dar vader mala duras Venezuela 
--------------- -------·---- -
1950 0. 1 0. 2 0. 2 5. 9 34.9 46. 3 31 . 2 46. 1 56 . 2 48 . 8 57 . 4 
1951 0. 1 0. 3 0.2 6. 4 37 . 3 50. 2 32 . 2 53 . 9 58. 7 49 . 1 61.5 
1952 0.2 0, 3 0.2 6,3 36.3 so . 7 33 . 3 53 . 0 57.5 51.7 62.2 
1953 0.2 0. 7 0. 3 6. 6 36 . 5 49 . 9 33 . 5 56 . 5 59 . 2 53 . 0 61.3 
1954 0. 2 1. 5 0. 4 7. 1 37 . 4 49 . 0 34 . 7 58 , 6 60 . 8 56 . 1 61 . 4 
1955 0. 2 2. 8 0. 4 7. 2 38 . 8 49 . 0 35 . 2 61 . 0 61.8 60 . 8 61.2 
1956 0. 3 7. 7 0. 5 7.7 39 . 2 49 . 6 33 . 5 61 . 9 62 . 4 58 . 4 61.7 
1957 0. 4 16 . 6 0. 5 9. 7 40 . 3 52 . 0 33 . 8 59 . 1 61 . 8 57 . 2 60 . 5 
1958 0.5 17. 1 0. 6 11. 3 41 . 4 51 . 0 34 . 3 62 . 5 62 . 4 58 . 8 63.3 
1959 1. 0 20.6 0. 8 12. 4 41 . 5 50 . 9 34.4 62 . 1 62 . 1 59.5 66.5 
1960 1. 2 23 . 0 1.1 12 . 9 41.9 49 .1 34 . 8 62.0 61 . 4 58 . 4 68. 8 
1961 1.4 24. 7 1.4 13. 8 42.9 47 .1 36 . 3 60 . 3 61. 1 59 . 4 67.0 
1962 1.8 26 . 1 2. 1 14. 1 44,0 51. 5 37. 3 60 . 4 62 . 3 60.0 66 . 7 
1963 2. 2 26 . 0 3. 6 17. 9 45.3 55 . 9 39.5 61.3 62 . 4 61.8 67.4 
1964 2. 7 28 . 6 6. 9 21.0 46 . 8 57.1 40 . 9 62.3 62.3 64.6 68.9 
1965 3. 4 29 . 4 11.4 22 . 7 46 . 5 56 . 0 42 . 2 62 . 7 61 . 8 66.6 70 . 0 
1966 4. 6 31.5 16.1 26 . 7 46 . 6 56 . 1 43.9 62 . 0 62 . 2 67.8 71 . 3 
1967 5. 9 35 . 0 21.0 28. 5 47.2 56 . B 45 . 6 62 . 9 62.5 68 . 3 71.3 
1968 6. 8 36 . 9 26 . 0 30 . 3 49.0 56 . 9 47 . 5 64 . 5 63.7 71.6 72.2 
1969 7. 4 37.7 31.5 32.3 50 . 4 57 . 4 50.6 64 . 4 65. 1 73 . 1 73 . 9 
TABLE 3--Continued 
Bali- Col om- Costa Dominican Ecua- El Sal- Guate- Hon-
Year Argentina via Brazil bia Rica Republic dor vador mala duras Venezuela 
1970 8.3 39.2 38.5 34.8 52.7 59.6 53.2 66.2 66.6 73.7 75.8 
1971 11.2 40.6 48.3 38 . 7 54.3 62.2 57.6 66.5 66.3 75.3 78.3 
1972 17. 8 43.3 53 . 9 45 . 8 56.8 67 . 1 62.2 67.5 66.7 79.3 80.5 
1973 28. 7 56.9 60.8 58.6 65.5 77.2 70 . 3 71.8 75.8 83.4 83.8 
1974 35.4 92.6 77.8 79 . 7 85 . 2 87.4 86.7 83.9 88.4 94.1 90.8 
1975 100. 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100. 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1976 543.2 104.5 141.9 122.9 103.5 110.7 110.7 107.0 110.7 104.8 107.7 
1977 1499. 6 112 . 9 203.9 155.7 107.8 121.7 125.1 119.7 124.6 113.6 116.0 
1978 4131.4 124 . 7 282.9 183. 2 114 . 3 126.0 139.6 135.5 134.5 120.6 124. 3 
1979 10721.4 149.3 232.2 234. 1 124. 8 137.5 154.0 157.0 150.0 135.7 139.6 
1980 21524.0 219.8 790.2 290.8 147 . 7 160 . 6 174.1 184.3 166.1 156.9 169.7 
SOURCE: Compiled from International Monetary Fund . 1982. International Financial Stat is-
tics Yearbook. Washington, D.C. 
* All figures are based on 1975 prices. 
TABLE 4 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (1975 PRICES) 
Boli- Col om- Costa Dominican Ecua- El Sal- Guate- Hon-
Year Argentina via Brazil bia Rica Republic dor vader mala duras Venezuela 
1950 513400 18238 150000 118630 3756 827.8 24010 1289 1119 908 26350 
1951 618000 19523 136000 122330 3809 926 . 3 24680 1372 1135 948 29440 
1952 668000 20116 166700 128700 4322 1023.0 32100 1460 1159 956 31330 
1953 714000 18214 185200 136520 4824 1010.1 33120 1498 1201 1014 33260 
1954 750000 18592 171400 145970 5125 1068.8 35810 1545 1224 952 36470 
1955 869000 19572 200000 151670 5376 1135.0 36740 1612 1254 1008 39700 
1956 824000 18413 208300 157820 5512 1248.9 38050 1709 1368 1053 43900 
1957 796000 17806 222200 161350 6067 1327.8 40050 1805 1445 1097 45380 
1958 860000 18227 245900 165310 6169 1397 . 7 40970 1824 1513 1158 45960 
1959 860000 18171 235300 177250 6373 1406.8 43080 1905 1587 1185 49660 
1960 924000 19727 245500 184820 6955 1424 . 4 45940 1983 1626 1183 51640 
1961 988000 19940 265000 194230 6897 1392.5 46650 2053 1696 1216 54190 
1962 979000 20468 279000 204740 7459 1629 . 5 48760 2298 17 56 1278 59130 
1963 943000 21857 346400 211470 7816 1752 . 2 50670 2397 1923 1320 63250 
1964 920000 22721 356500 224520 8140 1824.0 54610 2620 2012 1398 69350 
1965 1027000 23840 439200 232600 8941 1625. 5 46560 2761 2100 1542 73540 
1966 1131000 25549 455570 245050 9644 1838. 6 50300 2959 2216 1633 75370 
1967 1139000 27161 478000 235350 10189 1901 . 0 54280 3120 2307 1709 78250 
1968 1178000 32889 531400 270940 11053 1910.3 56810 3221 2509 1833 82080 
1969 1235000 34393 584100 288140 11659 21 43 . 5 59100 3333 2628 1839 85740 
TABLE 4--Continued 
Bali- Col om- Costa Domini can Ecua- El Sa l- Guate- Hon-
Year Argentina via Brazil bia Ri ca Republic dor vador mala duras Venezu el a 
----- --------- --------
1970 1267000 37072 641100 307130 12537 2335 . 8 62910 3432 2778 1948 93250 
1971 1313000 38888 718100 324860 13384 2589.8 66850 3597 2933 2105 96070 
1972 1338000 41145 798200 350170 14478 2859 . 0 76490 3794 3148 2179 99200 
1973 1386000 43893 909800 375060 15595 3227.7 95870 3986 3362 2239 105240 
1974 1490000 46153 996300 397660 16459 3421.4 102050 4242 3576 2258 111670 
1975 1459000 49201 1052100 412830 16805 3599 . 1 107740 4478 3646 2212 118280 
1976 1412000 52201 1154000 431840 17732 3841.3 117680 4655 3915 2366 128220 
1977 1483000 54398 1217000 452790 19311 2564 . 5 125370 4938 42 21 2485 136980 
1978 1427000 56223 1275200 493340 20522 2619.5 133630 5233 4432 2611 141300 
1979 1599000 57254 1360500 518320 21536 2741 . 6 140420 5155 4641 5901 142530 
1980 1622000 57601 1467600 539050 21803 2899.6 147200 4660 4803 2977 140840 
--------- ----- -- -- -------- ---
SOURCE: Compiled from International Monetary Fund . 1982 . Internati onal Financial Stat is-
tics Yearbook . Washington, D.C. 
Note: See Table 2, page 12 , for currency of respective country . 
TABLE 5 
AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATE (MONEY STOCK) 
Country 1950-80 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 
Argentina 68 .42 22 . 56 119.76 
Bolivia 34 . 33 60 . 33 13 . 52 24 . 80 
Brazil 38 . 37 22. 19 48.46 43 . 37 
Co 1 ombi a 19. 57 14 . 82 18.07 24 . 54 
Costa Rica 12.83 7. 20 9.36 20.46 
Dominican Republic 9. 95 9. 07 6. 69 14.68 
Ecuador 14.74 6.42 13. 10 16 . 41 
El Sa l vador 8.83 4. 05 4.19 16. 41 
Guatemala 9.44 5. 78 4. 89 16.35 
Honduras 9. 94 5. 24 8. 92 14.16 
Venezuela 12. 72 8. 21 6.1 3 21. 59 
SOURCE : 
Fund. 1982. 
Computed from data presented in International Monetary 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Washing-
ton, D.C. 
TABLE 6 
AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATE (CONSUMER PRICE INDEX) 
Country 1950-80 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 
Argentina 76 . 17 21 . 45 132.02 
Bali via 30.55 62.67 6. 10 18. 75 
Brazil 35.12 16. 85 43. 66 43. 18 
Colombia 13.82 7.62 10.05 22 . 36 
Costa Rica 4.96 1. 70 2. 20 10.56 
Dominican Republic 4.25 o. 58 1. 53 9. 90 
Ecuador 5. 85 1. 02 4.05 11 . 98 
El Salvador 4. 77 2. 87 0. 60 10. 23 
Guatema l a 3.69 0. 82 0. 64 9. 03 
Honduras 3. 92 1. 71 1. 98 7.28 
Venezuela 3.67 1. 70 1. 21 7. 97 
SOURCE : Computed from data presented in International Monetary 
Fu nd . 1982. International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Wash i ng-
ton, D. C. 
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TABLE 7 
AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATE (REAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT) 
Country 1950-80 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 
Argentina 2.91 3. 70 3. 36 
Bolivia 3. 90 0,85 6, 81 4.82 
Braz i1 7.89 5.00 9. 76 8. 77 
Colombia 5.00 4.13 5.21 5.87 
Costa Rica 5.89 5.85 6.38 5,88 
Dominican Republic 4. 57 5.14 4.99 3.67 
Ecuador 6.26 6.33 3.70 8. 79 
El Salvador 4.29 4.00 5.53 3.20 
Guatema 1 a 4.84 3. 48 5.24 5.65 
Honduras 3.96 2. 49 4.66 4. 53 
Venezuela 5.60 6. 37 5. 92 4.66 
SOURCE: 
Fund. 1982. 
ton, D.C. 
Computed from data presented in International Monetary 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Washing-
The nominal quantity of money (M 1), as measured by the sum of 
currency with the public and demand deposits, increased during 1950-80 
at an average annual rate as high as 68 . 42 percent for Argentina and 
as low as 8.83 percent for El Salvador. The range of growth rate of 
money for the period 1950-60 was between 60.33 percent for Bolivia and 
4.05 percent for El Salvador. The money growth range was 48.46 per-
cent for Brazil and 4.19 for El Salvador, and 283.53 percent for 
Argentina and 14.16 percent for Honduras for periods 1960-70 and 
1970-80, respectively. 
During the period 1950-80, consumer prices increased at an 
average annual rate as high as 76.17 percent for Argentina and as low 
as 3.67 percent for Venezuela. The range of average annual growth 
rate of cons umer prices during the 1950-60 period was 62.67 percent 
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for Bolivia and 0.58 percent for Dominica~ Rep u:li c . For the 1960-70 
period, it was 43.66 percent for Brazil and 0. 60 percent for El Salva-
dor. The range for the 1970-80 period was 132.02 percent for Argen-
tina and 7. 28 percent for Honduras. It is important to point out that 
the rate of inflation, however, started from a relatively low level 
and accelerated over time. The rate of acceleration was tremendous 
during the period 1970-80 almost without exception for all countr ies 
under study . 
In the meantime , the real gross domestic product at 1975 prices 
exhibited an average growth of 7. 89 percent for Brazil (highest) and 
3. 90 percent for Bolivia (lowest) per annum in 1950-80. However, 
within 1950-60, the highest rate was 6.37 percent for Venezuela and 
the lowest growth rate achieved was Bolivia's 0.85 percent. The 
highest and lowest for the 1960-70 and 1970-80 periods were 9. 76 
percent for Brazil and 3.70 percent for Ecuador and Argentina, 8.79 
percent for Ecuador and 3. 20 percent for El Salvador, respectively. 
However, the continuous growth was not uniform for all coun-
tries . In most cou ntrie s , for several years the growth rate of real 
gross domestic product was negative. 
Monetary Base 
The factors that account for the growth of the money supply are 
monetary base and money multiplier. Therefore, variation in base 
money will have a direct effect upon the stock of money . As already 
mentioned, financing the government deficit by acquiring credit from 
the central bank has been a common practice for many Latin American 
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countries. This form of financing has an effect upon the domestic 
credit component of the monetary base . An increase in domestic credit 
will result in an increase in the base money and ultimately in an 
increase in the money supply. 
Data on monetary base is shown in Table 8 for all countries 
under study. Corresponding annual percentage growth rates of base 
money can be seen in Table 9. 
During 1950-80, the highest average annual percentage base 
money growth rate belongs to Argentina with 79 . 42 percent, while the 
lowest belongs to El Salvador with 9.04 percent. Within 1950-60, 
Bolivia is the country which exhibits the highest growth rate , 61 . 92 
percent, and the lowest growth rate within that period belongs to El 
Salvador with 3 percent. The highest and lowest rates for 1960-70 and 
1970-80 are as follows: Brazil with 48.68 percent and Venezuela with 
4. 71 percent; and Argentina with 145.28 percent and Dominican Republic 
with 13 percent , respectively. Again , it is interesting to point out 
that almost with no exception the growth rate of the monetary base for 
all countr ies under study is accelerated within the 1970-80 period. 
Another important point is that the total base money in most of these 
cou ntries grew at a rate almost equal to the rate of growth of the 
tota l supply of money . Thus , the growth of the money supply in Latin 
America seems to have been caused almost exclusively by the growth of 
the monetary base. 
Domestic Credit and Net Foreign Assets 
Data on the supply side are required to decompose the monetary 
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TABLE 8 
MONETARY BASE IN MILLIONS OF RESPECTIVE COUNTRY' S CURRENCY 
---------
Boli- Col om- Costa Dominican Ecua- El Sal- Guate- Hon-
Year Argentina via Brazil bia Rica Repub lic dor vador mala duras Venezuela 
---------------------------------·------
1950 300 4 40 600 124 29.4 727 101.3 51.4 22 .9 1187 
1951 400 5 50 600 144 39.3 675 107. l 52.3 27.4 1236 
1952 500 8 60 810 170 45.0 848 124.8 57.1 40.4 1378 
1953 600 15 70 910 188 44.8 871 123.4 68.7 44.5 1424 
1954 700 28 90 1090 205 56.9 964 131.6 69.7 55. 1 1445 
1955 BOO 54 100 1050 209 58.4 932 129.2 75.2 47.7 1555 
1956 1000 183 120 1280 210 61.2 1043 144.6 91.1 51.3 1789 
1957 600 258 160 1470 233 70.0 1098 143.6 96.5 48.7 2364 
1958 900 260 190 1830 251 74.3 1062 138.7 85.4 47.4 2695 
1959 1200 347 260 1950 261 71.0 1190 145.1 90 .1 47.2 2443 
1960 1400 399 370 2040 275 83.5 1266 137.4 88.6 46.8 2421 
1961 1400 470 600 2300 268 74. 1 1287 146. 3 94.6 46.4 2509 
1962 1500 505 970 2230 287 87.2 1469 153.1 92.9 50.4 2243 
1963 2100 594 1660 3290 319 105.5 1629 180.0 104.8 55. 7 2503 
1964 3000 727 3050 4420 332 100.8 1938 191.7 112.3 61.5 2635 
1965 4100 850 5140 5290 356 127.2 2012 212.1 121.4 69. 1 2826 
1966 5200 1032 6500 5790 364 117.2 2259 218 . 9 132.4 71.2 2934 
1967 6500 1080 8160 7050 455 117.3 2398 260.4 132.8 83.8 3248 
1968 8400 1145 11890 9260 506 137.9 2892 276 .4 131.9 94.2 3654 
1969 8300 1267 15360 11840 601 161.5 3420 302.0 145. 8 109.3 3851 
TABLE 8--Continued 
-------
----
Boli- Col om- Costa Dominican Ecua- El Sal- Guate- Hon-
Year Argent ina via Brazil bia Rica Republic dor vador mala duras Venezuela 
-------- -------
1970 10000 1414 18280 13700 602 180.9 4505 316. 7 164.7 11 9. 2 3973 
1971 12900 1679 23920 15360 771 211.0 4986 346 .6 173. 2 129.9 4943 
1972 18500 1974 29120 18920 933 229.3 6456 412.8 220 .4 144.6 5562 
1973 126600 2768 44120 24810 1095 288.0 9115 480.1 262.4 167.6 6925 
1974 202400 3668 58910 30100 1249 421.8 12934 568. 7 303.6 156.8 9647 
1975 551100 4348 76320 37750 1668 388. 8 12875 682.5 361. 5 183.0 13656 
1976 2511100 6315 116300 53430 2238 389.8 17492 955 .7 555.6 255 . 9 16214 
1977 3610600 7884 172390 74840 3265 499.7 19832 1047.4 665 . 6 301 . 4 19431 
1978 7035100 8836 245540 115940 3251 541.7 23031 1000.4 724.4 377 . 0 21809 
1979 13213000 9832 452040 149490 5006 587.3 29478 1218.9 785 .5 428.6 24600 
1980 23599000 13734 412980 193120 5975 565.9 34845 1323 . 2 775.8 421 . 0 26213 
- ----------- --------~--
SOURCE: Compiled from International Mo netary Fund. 1982. International Financial Stat is-
tics Yearbook. Washington , D.C. 
Note: See Tabl e 2, page 12, for currency of respective co untry. 
N 
N 
TABLE 9 
AVERAGE ANNUA L PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATE (MONETARY BASE) 
Country 19 50- 80 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 
-·-----·----
Argent i na 79 .42 22 .15 145.28 
Bo li via 34 . 79 61.92 13.77 24 . 76 
Brazil 38.64 22 .96 48 . 68 42.82 
Colombia 21.32 12.35 20 .1 8 29.41 
Costa Rica 14.05 7.66 8.16 24 . 29 
Dominican Republic 10. 81 10.53 9. 61 13. 02 
Ecuador 13.99 5. 54 13.17 24.19 
El Sa l vador 9.04 3.01 7. 54 14.88 
Guatema la 9. 71 5.45 5. 78 17.16 
Honduras 10. 53 7.83 8. 95 13.65 
Venezuela 11.11 7.18 4. 71 19.62 
SOURCE : 
Fund. 1982. 
Computed from data presented in International Mo netary 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Was hing-
ton , D.C. 
base into foreign exchange reserve and domestic credit component . The 
net forei gn asset consists of the gross holding of international 
reser ves (including Spec ial Drawing Rights , reserve position in the 
International Monetary Fund, foreign exchange, and go ld) and other 
foreign claims less foreign liabilities-mainly in the form of fore i gn 
deposits. The net domestic assets consist of the sum of central 
banks ' claims on government, commerc ial and cooperati ve banks, and 
other financial institutions, less the sum of government deposits and 
cap ita l accounts. The net domestic assets corre spond to the domestic 
cred it component of the monetary base, wh il e the net foreign assets 
correspond to the theoreticall y-defi ned foreign exchange reserve . 
These two constitute the monetary base . 
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Data on the domestic credit component and net foreign assets 
for countries under study are shown in Tables 10 and 11 , respectively. 
The domestic credit component of the monetary base has been rising for 
most of the countries in the study. The highest growth rate for the 
1950-80 period was in Venezue l a with 177.34 percent, and the lowest 
was in Guatema la with -29.83 percent. 
the domestic credit component is not 
However, the rate of growth of 
homogenous within different 
periods of time. During 1950-60, Dominican Republic's rate was the 
highest with 156.61 percent and El Salvador with 7. 73 percent was the 
lowest. The highs and lows for 1960-70 and 1970- 80 were Brazil with 
48.45 percent and Venezuela with -83.95 percent; 
351 .46 percen t and Colombia with -60.77 percent, 
and Venezuela with 
respectively. Based 
on information in Table 3, it i s important to note that these coun-
tries are not following some target for t he growth of their domestic 
credit component . This supports the assumption that governments use 
monetary base to offset their balance budget deficits or surpluses . 
The average annual percentage growth rate for domestic credit compo-
nent for all countries under study here is shown in Table 12 . The 
growth of the domestic credit component of the monetary base has been 
caused by reserve banks' financing of the budget deficits of the 
government. 
The growth rates for net foreign assets are shown in Table 13. 
As seen from this table, there is a wide variation between these 
countries and even within the country in different periods of time . 
For most of the countries , net foreign assets were negati ve for quite 
a few years , and sometimes for the whole period under study . Within 
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Year Argent ina 
1950 N/A 
1951 N/A 
1952 N/A 
1953 N/A 
1954 N/A 
1955 N/A 
1956 N/A 
1957 N/A 
1958 1000 
1959 1100 
1960 1200 
1961 1150 
1962 1200 
1963 2200 
1964 3100 
1965 3900 
1966 5000 
1967 5300 
1968 7000 
1969 6800 
TABLE 10 
DOMESTIC CREDIT IN MILLIONS OF RESPECTIVE COUNTRY'S CURRENCY 
Boli- Col om- Costa Dominican Ecua- El Sal- Guate- Hen-
vi a Brazil bia Rica Republic dor vader mala duras 
- --- ----- ----
2 50 363 69 -2.1 169 -7.3 13. 2 -13.2 
2 60 397 71 -6.0 225 -5 . 0 12.6 -22.4 
6 70 500 63 0.4 208 7. 8 13 .4 -11.0 
11 80 530 66 5. 6 329 6.7 26 .7 -7.0 
24 100 650 88 1. 3 407 8.0 29.3 1.6 
50 120 860 67 19.0 542 16.7 18.7 4.0 
289 150 960 115 28 . 0 626 39.1 19 . 0 11 . 4 
318 190 1720 135 42.6 627 26 .5 25.4 19. 0 
359 240 1970 104 50.9 559 21. 8 39 . 0 26 . 7 
461 330 1890 173 73.9 592 34 . 4 47.3 25 . 3 
542 470 1990 263 70.0 724 74 . 5 40.2 26 . 3 
583 700 2420 317 95.8 878 106.2 50.1 33.0 
662 1070 3060 295 107.1 841 96 . 8 61.5 36.4 
671 2660 4420 317 109.6 808 81 . 0 62 . 5 42. 0 
618 5450 5660 385 139.1 1031 90 . 7 73.4 40.7 
595 6640 6120 297 131.6 1325 87.8 87.5 38. 1 
708 7600 7180 421 149.9 1317 119.9 108.4 37.9 
855 9260 8360 377 155.6 1284 168. 1 97 . 2 49.7 
924 14390 10530 367 172.6 1947 170 . 4 93 . 8 39.4 
1027 16060 13040 250 178.6 2494 208 . 5 98.2 62 . 3 
Venezuela 
30 
64 
-6 
-102 
-76 
-112 
- 1172 
-2149 
-622 
263 
531 
681 
433 
224 
-473 
-139 
73 
-57 
105 
252 
N 
"' 
TABLE 10--Continued 
----
-------------
Boli- Col om- Costa Dominican Ecua- El Sal- Guate- Hon-
Year Argentina v i a Brazil bia Rica Repub li c dor vador mala duras Venezuela 
-----·-
1970 7300 111 8 17680 15060 430 191.9 3224 185.6 88.2 95 . 8 -31 
1971 11600 1441 141 20 18410 491 215.4 4449 217. 1 85.2 97 .1 - 1099 
1972 19200 1266 4020 18400 603 214.1 3354 230 . 4 86.3 87. 2 -1578 
1973 125200 2544 5120 19800 606 264. 3 3510 348.3 52.9 102. 0 -3304 
1974 198900 1166 18710 34370 111 8 412.8 5673 418.4 116. 5 126.7 -17836 
1975 535000 2687 35620 36610 1470 357.0 7002 410.0 66.8 115.8 -24084 
1976 2239500 3430 47000 33290 1547 401.2 7287 498 . 9 51. 8 131. 1 -17959 
1977 2143200 4972 77590 20610 1658 449.2 5352 536 . 2 4.6 78.3 -14958 
1978 2881400 8382 51840 31730 1875 574 .1 7395 411.3 -8.4 82 . 5 -6958 
1979 7832000 12392 167940 3500 4489 627.1 129 11 902 . 9 85 .3 150.4 -10275 
1980 26808000 18930 472080 -21410 6511 726 . 6 12173 1480.4 332. 9 242 . 2 -5479 
-----·--·-------------
SOURCE: Compiled from International Mo netary Fund. 1982. International Financial Stat is-
tics Yearbook. Washington, D.C. 
Note : See Table 2, page 12 , for currency of respective country . 
N 
"' 
TABLE 11 
NET FOREIGN ASSETS OF RESPECTIVE COUNTRY'S CURRENCY 
Bali- Col om- Costa Dominican Ecua- E1 Sal-
Year Argentina via Brazil bia Rica Republic dor vador 
1950 N/A 2 -10 237 55 31.5 558 108.6 
1951 N/A 3 -10 203 73 45.3 450 112.1 
1952 N/A 2 -10 310 107 44 . 6 640 117.0 
1953 N/A 4 -10 380 122 39 . 2 542 116.7 
1954 N/A 4 -10 440 117 55 . 6 557 123.6 
1955 N/A 4 -20 190 142 39.4 390 112.5 
1956 N/A -106 -30 320 95 33,2 417 105.0 
1957 N/A -60 -30 -250 98 27 . 4 471 117.1 
1958 -100 -135 -50 -140 147 23.4 503 116.9 
1959 100 -114 -70 60 88 -2 . 9 598 109.7 
1960 200 -143 -100 50 12 13. 3 542 62.9 
1961 250 -113 -100 -120 -49 -2 . 1 409 40. 1 
1962 300 - 157 -100 -830 -8 -19.9 628 56.3 
1963 -100 -77 - 1000 -1130 2 4. 1 821 99,0 
1964 -100 109 - 2400 -1240 -53 -38.3 907 101.0 
1965 200 225 -1500 -830 59 -4 . 4 687 124.3 
1966 200 324 -1100 -1390 -57 -32.7 942 99.0 
1967 1200 225 -1100 -1310 78 -38.3 1114 92 . 3 
1968 1400 221 -2500 -1270 139 -34.7 945 106.0 
1969 1500 240 -700 -1200 251 -17.1 926 93.5 
Guate- Hon-
mala duras 
38.2 36. 1 
39.7 49.8 
43.7 51.4 
42 . 0 51 . 5 
40 . 4 53.5 
56,5 43.4 
72.1 39.9 
71.1 29 .7 
46.7 20.7 
42.8 21.9 
48.4 20 .5 
44.5 13.4 
31.4 14.0 
42 . 3 13. 7 
38.9 20.8 
33 . 9 31.0 
24.0 33.3 
35.6 34.1 
38. 1 54.8 
47.6 47 . 0 
Venezuela 
1157 
1172 
1384 
1526 
1511 
1667 
2962 
4506 
3317 
2180 
1890 
1828 
1810 
2279 
3108 
2965 
2861 
3305 
3549 
3599 
N 
_, 
TABLE 1 1 --Continued 
Boli- Col om- Costa Dominican Ecua- El Sa l- Guate- Hon-
Year Argentina via Brazil bia Rica Republic dor vador mala duras 
------------------- ------- -· 
1970 2700 296 600 -1360 172 -11.0 1281 131.1 76.5 23.4 
1971 1300 238 9800 -3050 280 -4.4 537 129.3 88.0 32.8 
1972 -700 718 25100 520 330 15.2 3103 182.4 134.1 57.4 
1973 1400 224 39000 5010 489 23.7 5605 131.8 209.5 65.6 
1974 3500 2502 40200 -4270 131 9.0 7261 150.3 187.1 30.1 
1975 16100 1661 40700 1140 198 31.8 5872 272.5 294.7 67.2 
1976 271600 2885 69300 20140 691 -11.4 10205 456.8 503.8 124.8 
1977 1467400 2912 94800 54230 1607 so. 5 14480 511.2 661.0 223 .1 
1978 4153700 454 193700 84210 1376 -32.4 15636 589 .1 732.8 294 . 5 
1979 5381000 -2560 284100 145990 517 -39.8 16567 316 .0 700. 2 278.2 
1980 -3209000 -5196 240900 214530 -536 -160.7 22672 -157.2 442.9 178.8 
--------
SOURCE: Compiled from International Monetary Fund. 1982. International Financial 
tics Yearbook. Washington. D.C. 
Note: See Table 2, page 12, for currency of respective country. 
Venezuela 
4004 
6042 
7140 
10229 
27483 
37740 
34173 
34689 
28767 
34875 
31692 
Stat is-
N 
CXl 
29 
TABLE 12 
AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATE (DOMESTIC CREDIT) 
Country 1950-80 1950-60 1960-70 1970-80 
Argentina 82.93 20.92 154.89 
Bolivia 50.67 96.03 8. 75 40.42 
Brazil 48.54 23.08 48.45 70.05 
Colombia -8.18 18.44 21.18 -60.77 
Costa Rica 20.71 17.30 12.77 39.58 
Dominican Republic 99.67 256 .61 9. 71 14.77 
Ecuador 17.30 15 .79 17.95 19.72 
El Salvador 15.56 7.73 21.11 24.61 
Guatemala -29.83 15.43 6.84 -108.62 
Honduras 19.66 27.32 15.22 18.11 
Venezuela 177.34 231.31 -83.95 351.46 
SOURCE: Computed from data presented in International Monetary 
Fund. 1982. International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Washing-
ton, D. C. 
TABLE 13 
AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE GROWTH RATE (NET FOREIGN ASSET) 
Country 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Venezuela 
1950-80 
95.65 
-68.71 
101.19 
84.13 
-121.69 
-77.44 
26.33 
2.82 
12.04 
12. 59 
15.67 
1950-60 
231.08 
27.23 
-26.66 
0.38 
-61.45 
1. 50 
-3.62 
3.91 
-3.47 
8. 61 
1960-70 
28.68 
-8.05 
80 .75 
28.57 
-370.08 
-137.17 
10.28 
7.14 
9.20 
6.20 
6. 56 
1970-80 
198.94 
49.93 
164.21 
234.87 
16.03 
-73.66 
65.06 
4.20 
27.55 
27.60 
28 .79 
SOURCE: 
Fund. 1982. 
ton, D.C. 
Computed from data presented in International Moneta ry 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook. Washing-
1950-80 , the 
101.19 percent 
Costa Rica. 
growth rate fo r net foreign asset climbs as high 
for Brazil and falls as low as -1 21 . 69 percent 
as 
for 
It i s interest in g to note that for most of the countries, 
whenever net foreign as sets are negative, the domestic credit compo-
nent of base money has increased. 
During 1950-60, the highest growth rate of net foreign assets 
is attributed to Brazil with 27. 23 percent and the lowest is Bolivia 
with -231 . 08 percent. Within 1960-70 , the max imum growth rate remains 
in Brazil with 80 . 75 percent, and the lowest goes to Costa Rica with-
370. 08 percent growth rate. In the period of 1971-80 , only Dominican 
Republic has a negative growth rate (-73.66 percent) for net foreign 
assets. Of course, within the who l e period under study, the average 
annual growth rate was negative for Dominican Republic, while coun-
tries like Ve nezuela , Guatemala, Ecuador, Brazil, and Argentina had 
positive growth rates for the entire period . 
The government budget seems to have played a significant role 
in the growth of the money supply in Latin American economies. For 
this reason, instead of using the International Monetary Fund ' s ( 1982) 
ca l culated deficit , t he increase in the domestic credit component of 
base money has been used as a proxy variable fo r the deficit. This 
follows the assumption that almost 100 percent of the deficit is being 
financed by increasing government indebtedness to the central bank . 
Consequently, it is hypothesized that the growth of the domestic 
credit component of the monetary base was l argely ca used by the con-
tinuous deficit in the government budget . Again, another point that 
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must be mentioned is that Latin American countries , at least most of 
them, use domestic credit as a last resort for financing their huge 
deficits . That is, whenever they are faced with a balance-of-payments 
surplus , they finance a major part of their fiscal deficit with these 
reserves. When they run a balance-of-payments deficit, they finance 
this deficit as well as the fiscal deficit through borrowing from the 
central bank. This form of policy--that is, monetizing the deficit--
creates tremendous inflationary pressures and faces the country with a 
huge rate of inflation. 
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CHAPTER III 
SELF-GENERAT ING NATURE OF INFLATION: 
CLOSED ECONOMY CASE 
The inflationary financing of budget deficits has long beena 
common practice for many Latin American countr i es . The mode l which 
will be presented be l ow attempts to show the extent of the effects of 
deficit and inflation upon each other. 
The financing of deficits through money creation creates 
tremendous in flatio nary pressures in the economy . The expansion in 
t he nomina l money stock i ncreases the demand for goods and services 
and, thus , inc reases prices . The increase in prices leads to an 
increase in nominal government expenditures and, therefore , an 
increase in the budget deficit leading to a vi cious cycle of i nflatio n 
and def icit . This self-generating process causes inflation to sp i ral 
higher and higher unti l, in some cases it reaches the stage of near 
hyperi nflation . In order to summarize the who l e process , let us 
ass ume that a government has an initial de f icit which results in an 
i ncrease in t he monetary base . The i ncrease i n the mo netary base 
causes an increase i n the stock of money wh i ch , in turn , resu l ts in an 
increase in the pr ice level . The increase in the price level 
increases government ' s expenditures and , therefore , it has a deficit 
and the process repeats itse l f . 
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The Model 
A demand function similar to Cagan's (1956 ) is used for real 
per capital money balances: 
ln(!i._) = y - a E + q ln(ln)t 
np t t 
where Et is expected rate of price change ; P is price 1 eve 1; N is 
population; Y is gross domestic product; M is nominal money supply; 
and y, a , and q are constants. 
Since Et is the expected rate of price change, it is a 
nonobservable variable. Using geometrical l y declining weights will 
help in writing it as a function of observable variables . The 
following relationship i s used to write Et in terms of an observab le 
variab le: 
where expected rate of price change, i.e., Et is some positive 
proportion ( p) of the difference between the previous years ' actual 
and expected rates of price change , and, 
11 Et = Et - Et - 1 
u lnpt-l = lnPt_1-lnPt-2 
The following procedure has been used to generate the first 
equation of the model. Starting with the demand equation: 
M y 
ln(NP\ = y - a Et + qln(N\ 
ln(M)t - ln(N)t - ln(P)t 
( la) 
Lag equation (1a) by one period : 
y 
ln(P)t_1 = lnMt_1 - lnNt-l - y + a Et-l - qln(N\- 1 (1b ) 
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Since y is constant, therefore, 
or 
y 
y = lnMt-l - lnNt_1 - lnPt_1 + aEt_1 - qln(N)t_1 (1c) 
Subtract (1b) from (1a) and substituti ng (1c) in (1b) yields 
or 
lnPt - lnPt_1 lnMt - lnNt - lnMt_1 + lnNt_1 - Y + lnMt_1 
- lnNt_1 - lnPt_1 + aEt-l - qln( Y/N)t_1 + Et 
y 
- aEt_1 - qln(N)t + qln( Y/ N)t_1 
M M Y ~lnPt = ~ln(N)t - y + ln(N)t_1 - lnPt_1 + aEt - qln(N)t (1d) 
Since Et = ~Et + Et_1, equation (1d) becomes: 
M M ~lnPt = ~ln(N\- y + ln (N)t_1 - lnPt_1 + MEt+ aEt_1 
y 
- qln(N)t (1e) 
Since ~Et = 8( ~lnPt_ 1 - Et_1), equation (1e) becomes: 
M M ~lnPt = ~ln(N)t- y + ln(N)t_1 - lnPt_1 + a6~lnPt_ 1 
y 
- a8Et_1 + aEt_1 - qln(N)t (lf) 
M M ~lnPt = ~ln(N\- Y + ln (N)t-l - lnPt_1 + a8~lnPt_ 1 
y 
+ aEt_1(1 - 8) - qln(N)t (1g) 
from equation (1c) 
y M 
aEt-l = qln(N)t_1 + Y + lnPt_1 - ln(N)t_1 (1h) 
Substitute equation (1h) in equation (1g) 
M M ~lnPt = ~ln(N\- y + ln(N)t_1 - lnPt_1 + a8~lnPt_ 1 
+ (1 - S)qln(~)t_ 1 + (1 - S)y + (1 - 8)ln Pt_1 
M y 
- (1 - S)ln(N\-1 - qln(N)t (1i) 
or 
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M M llln(N)t y + ln(N\-l - lnPt_1 + a:f;lllnPt-l 
y y 
+ qln(N\-l - Sqln(N\-1 + y - Sy + lnPt-l - BlnPt_1 
M M Y 
- ln(N)t-1 + Bln(N)t - qln(N)t 
which follows equation (1) of the model : 
M t> lnPt = - Sy + llln(N\ + a:BillnPt-l + 8(ln(M/N)t_1 - lnPt-l ) 
- qln(Y/N)t + q(1 - S)ln(Y/N)t_1 (1) 
where 0 < 8 < is speed of adjustment of expected price change to the 
actual rate . 
It is assumed that the speed of movement in the price level is 
so fast that it makes desired and actual rates of per capita balances 
equal . Equation (1), the first equation of the model , expresses the 
relationship between the rate of change in the price level and the 
rate of monetary expansion . 
Since governments try to increase the money supply by 
increasing base money, equation (2) will express the relationship 
between money supply and base money. 
If there is an increase in monetary base either due to an 
increase in bank reserves or through money printing, an increase in 
the actual reserve to deposit ratio above the desired level >~ill 
result. Banks operating in a fractional reserve system will respond 
to this inequal i ty by creating new demand deposits. An increase in 
demand deposits will cause an increase in the money supply. Of 
course , this process is not instantaneous , and only after some 
specific period of time can it be felt in the economy. It is assumed 
that the rate of change in money stock is a geometric function of 
current and past rates of changes in the monetary base . 
Starting with the following functio nal form equation: 
~ 
llln~\ = .\ E (1 - .\ ) i lllnBT . i=O _, (2a) 
equat i on ( 2a) can be expanded: 
ll lnMt = .\lllnBT + .\ (1 - .\ )ll lnB1_1 + .\ (1 - .l. )
2lllnBT_2 
+ .\ (1 - .l. )36lnBT_3 (2b) 
lag equation (2 b) by one period 
ll lnMt-l = .\lllnBT-l + .\(1 - .\)6 lnBT_2 + .\ ( 1- .l. / ll lnBT_3 
+ .\(1 - .l. )36 lnBT_4 (2c) 
multiply both sides of equation (2c) by ( 1 - A) 
(1 - .\)6lnMt-l = .\ (1 - .\ )6lnBT-l + .\ (1 - .l. ) 2ll lnBT_2 
+ .\(1 - .l. )3ll lnBT_3 + .\ (1 - .l. )
4ll lnBT_4 (2d) 
Subtract equation (2d) from (2b) 
or 
ll lnMt = .\lllnBt + (1 - .\ )6 lnMt-l 
which is equati on (2) of the model . 
(2) 
The government finances its deficit by selling securities to 
the central bank. this form of financing increases currency both 
outside banks and bank reserves . The increase in domestic credit will 
result in an increase in the monetary base. The following 
relationship expresses the result: 
( 3a) 
where Bt is the monetary base; Dt is the deficit; and a and b are 
constants. 
"a" represents parameters other than deficit which contributes 
t o an increase in the monetary base . "b" represents the proportion of 
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the deficit which is financed by selling securities to the central 
bank; it is assumed that "b" i s positive. 
By solving equation (3a ) for the total base, equation (3) of 
the model can be derived: 
since 
or 
BT -1 = BT - ll BT 
BT-l = BT - (a + bOT) 
BT-2 =BT-l - llBT-1 
BT_2 = BT- (a+ bOT)- (a+ bDT-l) 
8T-3 = BT-2 - llBT-2 
BT_3 = BT- (a+ bOT)- (a+ bDT-l)- (a+ bDT_ 2) 
B0 = BT- (a+ bOt ) - (a + bDt-l) 
t 
B(-l) = BT- E a+ bO . 
i=O 1 
t 
==> BT = B(-l) + a(t + 1) +b E D. 
i=O 1 
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where B(-l) is initial base, which expresses the relationship between 
the deficit and the rate of growth of the money supp ly . The 
relationship specifies the rate of change in the monetary base as a 
function of current and past rates of nominal government expenditure 
since the initial period. 
The nominal deficit in year t is defined to be equal to nominal 
government expenditures, minus the nominal value of tax 
collection, Tt . 
It is assumed that the level of real government expenditure for 
year t is fixed at ft and expected nominal expenditures for the year, 
G:, are Pt-lft ' In addition , it is assumed that at the beginning of 
the year, the nominal value of taxes, Tt , is set equal to some 
positive fraction of expected nominal expenditure, ; . e. ' the 
government does not account for inflation in setting tax liabilities . 
It follows that the real value of the nominally fixed tax assessment 
declines as prices rise, causing the real deficit to vary directly 
with the rate of price change . Therefore , with a positive rate of 
price change, the nominal deficit at the end of the year exceeds the 
planned nominal deficit because: (1) the price level at the end of 
the year is higher than it was at the beginning of the yea r; and 
(2) the real deficit increases because actual nominal expenditures, 
Gt, exceeds planned nominal expenditures , G:. while nominal taxes 
remain fixed. 
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In order to derive the fourth equation of the model, the 
following steps have been taken . Let, 
Dt; Gt- Tt (4a ) 
where Gt ; Ptft if ft ; fixed level of real government expenditure is 
spe nt on end of the year ; and Gt; Pt-lft if entire ft is spent on 
beginning of the year. 
Therefore, nomi nal government expenditures during year t, Gt, 
will be given by evaluating the line integral of the price level 
function along the time path of real government expenditures: 
xi\lnP t 
G ; J P e dft(x) ( 4b) 
t ft(x) t-1 
where 0 < x < 1 is the length of the period over Ylhich expenditure i s 
made in one year . 
or 
ft(x) ; ft X 
ft(x) 
X; - f--
t 
f (x) 
ft t ll1 nP t 
t --r;-;;> Gt ; Pt_1e dft(x) 
lllnP 
ft(x) t ft 
ft ~ 
pt-1 ~e 0 
f t [ 
lllnPt J 
(Pt-1) e - 1 (4c ) (ll lnPt ) 
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Note : 
( 4d) 
It is assumed that payment of government expenditures take place one 
year after the time of contract, therefore, equation (4d) becomes: 
(4e) 
By s ubstituting equation (4e) into (4a) , it follows that 
[ 
(Pt-1 - pt-2)/(Pt- 2)] 0t = ft-1 (Pt-2) (&lnP ) - Tt 
t-1 
(4f) 
Now let 
\ = pt-2ti 
where Tt is nominal tax; ti is fixed real tax; and let 
(Pt-1 - pt-2 )/( Pt-2) 
(6 lnPt-l) = Ut 
Equation (4e) becomes 
t. 
0t = (ft-l )(Pt-2)Ut- pt-2ti = (Pt-2)Ut(ft-l - u:) (4g) 
where (Pt_2)Ut is an average price level over the year t , Pt and 
T. 
(ft-l - u;) is an average real deficit over the year t , gt . Note that 
ut = 1 if there is no change in price, and ut > 1 if there is change 
in price . Therefore , it is assumed that Ut ~ 1. Now the equation 
becomes : 
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(4) 
which is equation (4) of the model. 
Note that in determining equation (4), the following assump-
tions have been made: 
1. Real government expenditures are undertaken evenly over the 
year 
2. The current expenditures are based on obligations incurred one 
year before. 
This equation expresses the link between the nominal deficit 
and the rate of change in the price level. We can now write the 
system of four equations which explain: (1) the rate of change in the 
price level; (2) the rate of change in the money stock ; (3) the rate 
of change in the monetary base; and (4) the rate of deficit 
expenditures. 
From this model follows the self-generating nature of 
inflation: 
M M 
= - Sy + llln(.N)t + afllllnPt-l + fl(ln(N\-1-lnPt-l) 
- qln(Y/N)t + q(1 - S)ln(Y/N)t_1 
lllnMt = Allln (\ + (1 - i-) lllnMt_1 
a + bDt 
ill nBt = --------=---.,..t--
B(-1) + a(t + 1) + b E Di 
i=O 
[ 
(Pt-1 - pt-2)/(Pt-2)] 0t = g1 (Pt-2) (lilnPt_1) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
whe re lllnPt' lllnMt' lllnBt' and Dt are endogenous and lllnPt_1, llln Mt_1, 
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Dt-1, P t-1, and P t-2 are logged endogenous ; and on 1 y t, Y, and N are 
exogenous variables . 
We assume that demand for real per capita money balances is a 
random variable of the following form: 
M y ln(NP)t = y - aEt + qln('N\ + E1t (la) 
where Elt - (0, a1). And, s ince t.Et = S( t.lnPt-l - Et_1), equation (1) 
becomes 
lllnPt =- i3Y + llln(~)t + aSlllnPt-l + S(ln(~)t-l 
y y * 
- qln(R)t + q(l - B)ln(N)t-1 + Elt 
* where E1t (1 - S)Elt-l - E1t For the purpose of 
equation (lb) has been written in the following form: 
NP M 
t.ln(M)t = - Sy + aSlllnPt-l + S(ln(N)t-l- 1nPt_1) 
y y * 
- qln (R)t + q(l - S)ln(N)t-1 + Elt 
NP 
which expresses the dependent variable as t.ln(M )t 
estimation, 
(1) 
Since our 
dependent variable has been written in terms of all exogenous or 
lagged endogenous variables , application of or dinary least-squares 
method for esti mating the parameters is permissible. 
For estimating the rate of change in the money stock , the 
following form has been undertaken : 
lllnMt = >.!: (1 - >.)i t. lnBt-l + E2t i=O 
2 
where E2t - N(O , ~) • 
(2a) 
With the application of a Koyok transformation, equation (2a) 
becomes: 
(2) 
* where E2t = -(1 - >.)E2t -l + E2t • 
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For the purpose of estimation, the dependent variable is now 
Since equation (2) of the model has been writen in 
terms of endogenous variables , application of ordinary least-squares 
is not permissible . Two-stage least-squares has been used to estimate 
the parameter of the equation . 
The third equation expresses the variation in base money as a 
function of the def i cit . Here , because of the closed economy 
assumption , the effect of the foreign sector has been ignored . Since 
the deficit itself is a dependent variable , the two-stage least-
squares method has been used in order to estimate the parameters of 
the equation, i . e .. 
6Bt = a + bOt + E3t 
2 
where E3t - N(O, a3) • 
(3a) 
As shown in the derivation of equation (3), equation (3a) has 
been used to derive t he third equation of the model. 
relationship has been used to generate 6lnBt: 
t 
B(-1) + a(t + 1) +b E i=O 
D. 
1 
The following 
Equation (4) expresses the relationship between the rate of 
deficit and the price l eve l. It is: 
[ 
(Pt-1 - pt-2)/(Pt-2)] * 0t = g1 ( Pt-2 ) 6lnP + E4t 
t-1 
where 
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Again, since the rate of deficit has been expressed in terms of 
all lagged endogenous va riables, ordinary least-squares have been used 
to est imate parameter g1• Changes in the domestic cred it component 
have been used in the study as a proxy variable for the rate of 
deficit for two reasons: ( 1) the major part of the deficit is 
financed by borrowing from the central bank , and (2) explicit data 
regarding the rate of deficit i s not available for all countries . 
Ordinary least-squares method of estimation has been used to estimate 
the parameters of equations ( 1) and (4) . Because of the existence of 
dependent var iables on the right-hand s ide, two-stage least-squares 
was determined to be the appropriate estimation method for equations 
(2) and (3) . 
* Elt in equation ( 1) i s not an independentl y distributed random 
variable but is serially correlated. Therefore, least-squares 
estimation of the parameters in equation (1) is inefficient. It was 
not possible to express the error term as a simple first-order 
autoregressive scheme, and, therefore , no procedure i s availab le to 
obtain eff ic i ent estimates . M Furthermore, since lllnPt-l and llln (N)t-l 
* are correlated with the disturbance term E1t the least-squares 
* estimates of a , B. and q also are biased and inconsistent. E2t in 
equation (2) i s serially correlated, which introduces inefficiency and 
* correlation between ll lnMt-l and E2t introduce inconsi stency. The 
1 east-squares estimate of in equation (4) is consistent but 
* inefficient because E4t i s heteros kedastic . 
Furthermore, in order to avoid the statist ical problems, i.e., 
negative R2, a constant term has been added to equations (2) and ( 4) 
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rega rdless of whether it is specified, However, in empirical results , 
the estimates of constant terms fo r these equations have not been 
reported . 
Empirical Results 
In this section , the estimated parameters of equations of the 
model are reported under the closed economy assumption for the 
countr i es under study. 1 Tabl e 14 illustrates the first equation of 
the model which expresses the relationship between the rate of change 
in the price level and the rate of monetary expansion, Again, for 
purposes of estimation, equation (1) has been written in the fol lowing 
form: 
- 8y + aBlllnP t-l 
y 
- qln(N)t + q(l 
- lnPt-l) 
( 1) 
Table 15 reports the second equation of the model which relates 
the rate of monetary expansion to the rate of increase of the monetary 
base. For purposes of estimation , equation (2) of the model has taken 
the following form : 
(2) 
The third equation of the model has been summarized in Table 
16, Equation (3) of the model demonstrates the effect of an increase 
in the deficit on the rate of growth of the monetary base. Equation 
(3) has the following form: 
{3) 
1Countries have been chosen on the basis of availabilit y of 
homogenous data. 
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TABLE 14 
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF FIRST EQUATION OF MODEL: CLOSED ECONOMY 
Country Canst. a8 8 q q(l-8) R2 F ow 
Argentina 7. 49 0. 25* 0.38* -0 . 30 -0 . 42 0.35 1. 96 1. 30 
( 5. 1 3) (0. 11) (0 . 17) {0 . 75) (0 . 84) 
( 1. 46} (2.21) ( 2. 23) ( - 0. 40) ( -0 . 50) 
Bolivia 4. 16* 0.15 0. 55* -0.17 -0.43 0.44 4. 40 1. 75 
( 1. 52) (0 . 10) (0. 18) (0 . 51) (0.52) 
(2 . 72} (1.44) (2.98) {-0. 33} (-0.82} 
Brazil -0 . 06 0.84* -0.11 - 0. 30 0. 31 o. 76 17.93 1. 75 
(0. 59) (0. 12) (0. 17) (0 . 37) (0 . 39) 
(- 0. 11) {6.20} (-0 . 59) (-0 . 82) (0 . 80) 
Colombia 1. 99* 0. 89* 0. 16 -0.33 0. 05 0.66 11.24 2. 50 
(0 . 71) (0. 16} (0 . 09} (0 . 33) (0 . 33) 
(2 . 80) ( 5. 65) (1 . 64) (1.00) (0.17) 
Costa Rica 5. 60* 0. 89* 0.32* -0. 80 0.07 0. 57 7. 56 2.17 
( 1. 46) (0.25} (0. 12) (0 . 40) (0. 43} 
(3.83) ( 3. 55} (2 . 60} ( - 1. 99) (0 . 17} 
Domin i can Republic 2.10 -0.26 0. 60* -0 . 07 -0.23 0.30 2.42 2.21 
( 1. 1 7) {0 . 54) (0 . 21) (0 . 21) (0. 19) 
( 1. 79) ( -0 . 48) (2 . 80} (-0 . 32} (-1 . 15} 
Ecuador 0.31 0. 11 -0 . 005 -0 . 65* 0. 61* 0. 22 2. 00 2. 96 
(1 . 52) (0 . 54) (0. 1 1) (0. 28) {0. 27) 
{0 . 20) (0. 19) (-0.04) (- 2.32) (2 . 21) 
TABLE 14 . Continued 
-------
Country Con st . aB B q q(l-B) R2 DW 
-------
El Sal vador 1. 78* D. 41 D.lO - 0. 54 0. 27 0. 26 2. 00 2. 17 
(0 . 86) (0 . 50) (0 . 16) (0 . 39) (0. 41) 
(2.06) (0 . 82) (0 . 54) ( -1. 38) (0 . 67) 
Guatemala 1. 50 -0.50 0. 34* - 2.24* 2.04* 0.52 6. 31 1. 81 
(1 . 07 ) (0 . 33) (0 . 13) (0 . 54) (0 . 58) 
( 1. 41) (-1.48) (2.62) (- 4. 18) (3 . 53) 
Honduras 2. 70 1. 31* - 0. 004 -0 . 31 -0 . 12 0. 27 2.15 1.94 
(2.04) (0 . 64) (0 . 15) (0.46) (0 . 48) 
( 1. 32) (2 . 07) ( -0.02 ) (-1 . 67) (-0.24) 
Venezuela 2. 78 0.66 0. 04 - 0.50 0.17 0.14 1.00 1.17 
(1.78) (0 . 86) (0 . 11) (0 . 80) (0 . 80) 
( 1. 56) (0 . 77) (0.33) (-0.63) (0 . 22) 
Notes: 1. All tests of hypothesis in this study have been done at the 5 percent 
level of significance . 
2. The first terms in parentheses are the standard erros of the regression 
coefficients, and the second ones are the corresponding t values . Thi s 
practice of reporting regression equations has been maintained through-
out this study . 
48 
TABLE 15 
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF SECOND EQUATION OF MODEL: CLOSED ECONOMY 
Country R2 ow 
Argentina 0. 21 0. 10 1. 50 2. 05 
(0 . 17) 
(1 .22 ) 
Bolivia 0. 06 0. 03 0. 72 2. 29 
(0 . 07) 
(0 . 85) 
Brazil 0.006 0.01 0.24 2. 52 
(0 . 01) 
(0 . 49) 
Colombia -0 . 005 0.02 0. 31 2.55 
(0.03) 
( -0 . 1 7) 
Costa Rica 0. 012 0.002 0. 05 3. 15 
(0.05) 
(0.23) 
Dominican Republic 1. 10* 0.57 30. 00 1. 98 
(0. 20) 
(5.47) 
Ecuador 0.95* 0. 53 25 . 21 1. 97 
(0 . 19) 
(5 . 02) 
El Salvador 0.51* 0.24 7. 36 2. 08 
(0. 18) 
(2 . 72) 
Guatemala 0. 41* 0. 17 4. 74 1. 89 
(0. 18) 
(2 . 17) 
Honduras o. 79* 0. 45 18. 94 1.95 
(0 . 18) 
(4 . 35) 
Venezuela 0. 38* 0.20 5. 78 1. 97 
(0. 16) 
(2.40) 
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TABLE 16 
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THIRD EQUATION OF MODEL : CLOSED ECONOMY 
Country Con st. b R2 F DW 
Argent ina 0. 37048E + 06 0. 60* 0. 92 217.40 1. 21 
(0 . 17808E + 06 (0.04) 
(2 . 08) ( 14.745) 
Bolivia 118.50 0. 55* 0. 71 62.80 1. 61 
(99 . 11) (0. 07) 
( 1. 19) (7 . 92) 
Brazi 1 3887 . 70 1.20* 0. 88 193.78 0. 70 
(4384. 70) (0 . 09) 
(0.89) (13 . 92) 
Co lombia 5117.1 0* -2.20* 0. 94 432.97 1. 74 
( 581. 80) (0 . 11) 
(8 . 80) (-20 . 80) 
Costa Rica 30.09 0. 77* 0. 65 48,72 2. 23 
( 52.87) (0.1 1) 
(0. 57) (6 .98) 
Dominican Republ ic 8. 61 0. 39 0. 06 1. 70 2.01 
( 10. 12) (0 . 29) 
(0 . 85) (1 . 30) 
Ecuador -339.93 3, 64* 0. 78 93 . 30 2. 83 
(231. 25) (0.38) 
(-1. 47) (9.66) 
El Salvador 23 . 64 0.36* 0. 31 11.43 1. 90 
( 12. 42) (0 . 11) 
(1.90) (3 . 38) 
Guatemala 18. 66* 0. 62* 0.19 6.14 0. 96 
(7 . 92) (0 . 25) 
(2 . 36) (2 .48) 
Honduras 2.62 1. 20* 0.38 15.64 1. 42 
(4 . 37) (0 .31) 
(0 .60) (3 . 95) 
Venezuela 1112. 90* 1. 10* 0. 40 16.83 1.07 
( 189. 34) (0 . 28) 
( 5. 90) (4. 10) 
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Table 17 summarize s the result of the estimation of the fourth 
equation of the model which demonstrates the link between the nominal 
de ficit and the rate of change in the price level. Equation (4) has 
the following form: 
( 4) 
The ordi nary least-squares method has been used to estimate 
parameters of the first equation of the mode l. As Table 14 shows , the 
estimated parameter of A, the speed of adjustment of expected price 
cha nge to actual rate, meets our priori assumption regarding its 
va lue. It seems equation ( 1) captures well the relation between the 
rate of change in prices and the rate of monetary expansion for coun-
tries suc h as Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala. For coun-
tries like Argentina, Bolivia, and Dominican Republi c , on average only 
40 percent of the variation in price level is caused by monetary 
expansion. Howe ver, it appears that monetary expansion is not the 
engine behind increasing price levels in Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Honduras, and Venezuela, or at least the existing variables in our 
equation fail to show such a relationship. 
Because of the existence of an endogenous variable on the 
right-hand side of the second equation of the model, parameters are 
estimated using the two-stage least-squares method. Again, whenever 
the parameter A i s significant, it satisfies our priori assumption of 
its value, i.e., 0 < A< 1. Thi s equation does well for Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, and Honduras in describing the relationship between 
monetary expansion and the rate of increase of the monetary base. 
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TABLE 17 
EST IMATED PARAMETERS OF FOURTH EQUATION OF MODEL: CLOS ED ECONOMY 
Country 91 R2 ow 
Argentina 2628.50* 0.97 610.50 1. 51 
(106 . 38) 
(24 . 71) 
Bolivia 33.69* 0. 66 51.31 1.11 
(4 . 70) 
(7 . 16) 
Brazi l 639 . 42* D. 56 32 . 45 1.12 
(112 . 25) 
(5 . 70) 
Colombia -103 . 56* 0.42 18.19 2. 15 
(24.28) 
(-4.26) 
Costa Rica 17 .1 2* o. 50 25.51 1.35 
(3.39) 
( 5, 05) 
Dominican Republic 0. 83* 0. 30 11.22 2.60 
(0.25) 
(3. 35) 
Ecuador 13. 80 o. 13 3. 63 2. 20 
(7.24) 
( 1. 90) 
El Salvador 4. 55* 0. 54 29.70 1. 56 
(0 . 84) 
( 5. 45) 
Guatemala 1. 34* 0.32 12.11 1. 09 
(0 . 38) 
( 3. 48) 
Honduras 0. 54* 0.20 6,41 1. 28 
(0 . 22) 
(2 . 53) 
Venezuela 27 . 40 0.02 D. 77 1. 60 
( 31. 30) 
(0 . 88) 
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Parameter A i s statistically sign ifi cant except for Argent ina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, and Costa Rica, and the F-statistic 
exhibits poor explanatory power of variab les for these co untries. 
That i s, the increase in money supply is caused by sources other than 
the monetary base. Introducing the open economy assumption could 
introduce additional sources which might be responsible for the 
increase in money supply. Equation (3) of the model relates the 
fiscal deficit to the rate of growth of the money supply . Since the 
rate of defic it is one of the endogenous variables in the model, for 
estimation of parameters of the third equation, the method of two-
stage least-squares is appropriate. It seems for all countries under 
study except Dominican Republic, the increase in the rate of growth of 
the monetary base mainly has been caused by deficits. Except in the 
case of Colombia, the parameter b satisfies the priori assumption of 
nonnegativity. 
The link between the price level and the nominal deficit has 
been summarized by the fourth equation of the model. Except for 
Ecuador and Venezuela, the equation exhibits a sign ificant relation-
ship between our endogenou s and exogenous variables. The estimated 
parameter of for Colombia, even though significant, fails to 
exhibit the appropriate sign regarding our priori assumption, 
. aot 
1.e., a~ nPt > 0. That is, as prices go up, the deficit decreases for 
this country , or, in other words, government gains from inflation. 
This could be explained in terms of an increase in the nominal value 
of progressive taxes. 
The result of empirical testing reveals that, even though the 
countr ies under stud y experience inflation, the source of inflation i s 
not homogenous. The following generality can be made: 
1. Except for Guatemala and Ecuador, the coefficient of real per 
capita gross domestic product at the same year is insignifi-
ca nt . That is, an increase in real gross domestic product will 
take some time, one or more years, in order to be felt in the 
economy. Therefore, people's demand for money balances in year 
t is independent of real per capita gross domestic product in 
the same year . An estimate of the parameter lagged period 
shows some signifi cance in a few countries. That could be 
expected if people form their expectations adaptively and their 
demand for real per capita cash balances increases when the 
impact of increase in real GOP is felt in the economy. 
2. Almost whenever the coeff i cient of last year's prices is sig-
nificant, it has the appropriate sign, suggesting that people's 
demand for real per capita money balances i s affected by last 
period's prices . 
3. The speed of adjustment of expected price change to the actual 
rate varies from country to country . That could be due to 
differences in information in the countries under study and how 
the information is transmitted to the public. 
4. When the variation in the money stock is not explained by 
variation in the monetary base, it could be due to cha nges in 
the money multiplier. 
5. In most countries , an increase in the defici t caused base money 
to increase. When this phenomenon does not appear, it could be 
explained in terms of the effect of the other component of the 
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monetary base , net foreign assets . This could occur in the 
cases when the constant term, a, is l arge and significant and 
parameter b is either insignificant or very low. 
6. In some co untries where the price l eve l does not cause the 
deficit , the deficit may cause pri ces to increase . This could 
explain the insignificance of parameter g1 in equation ( 4) for 
a few countries . 
In the next chapter , by introducing an open economy model and a for-
eign sector variable a l ong with a test of causality between the def-
icit and the price leve l, some of these phenomenon will be answered . 
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CHAPT ER IV 
SELF-GENERATING NATU RE OF INFLATION: OPEN ECONOMY CASE 
In order to capture the effect on inflation of being an open 
economy , it is necessary to decompose the monetary base into a foreign 
exchange reserve and a domestic credit component (see Dornbusch 1980, 
chapter 1). These two constitute the sources of the monetary base. 
That is , 
8 = DC + NFA 
where B is monetary base, DC is domestic credit , and NFA is net 
foreign assets . 
In the model of Dutton (1971) money supply has been considered 
from the uses side . However, in the mode l of the present study , money 
supp l y is taken from the source side . That is, 
B = DC + NFA . 
Hence, the inflationary phenomenon and real income are considered to 
be exogeneous . In the model the following can be postulated: 
M = f(y} 
where M is import, and y is real gross domestic product. 
Based on the exogeneity nature of y, M also is exogeneous . 
Further, the capita l account of the balance of payment is ignored for 
simplification, and, since export is exogeneous, NFA can be defined 
as : 
NFA = X - M , 
and so NFA is considered to be exogeneous in the system. 
The growth rate of monetary base can be attributed to either 
the domestic credic component or to net foreign assets. An increase 
in the domestic credit component could be caused by monetizi ng the 
deficit, that is, financing government's de ficit by borrowing from the 
central bank. An increase in net foreign assets is due to a balance 
of payment surplus; that is, an accumulation of foreign reserves in 
the cou ntry due to either an increase in exports or a reduction in 
imports. Hence : 
NFA = X + R - M , 
where X is exports, R is net transfer receipts, and M is imports. 
Therefore, variations in exports and imports have a direct relation-
sh ip with foreign assets and ultimately with the monetary base and the 
money stock . 
It is important to outline the possible reasons which can cause 
va riat ions in net foreign assets . As already mentioned, a change in 
net foreign assets could be positive. That would happen when the rate 
of growth of exports exceeds the rate of growth of imports when, for 
example, currency has been either devaluated or depreciated . Many 
Latin American countries ha ve used devaluation policies in order to 
achieve a favorable balance of payments. When currency is devaluated, 
domestica ll y produced goods are attracted to foreign countries; at the 
same time, foreign goods become expensive in terms of domestic cur-
rency. Devaluation of currency under a fixed exchange rate increasaes 
exports and decreases imports. Under the satisfaction of the Ma rshall-
Lerner condition , another approach which has been used, especially by 
countries with floating exchange rates, i s currency depreciation . 
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Both of these approaches increase exports and ultimately lead to 
accumulation of foreign reserves . An increase in reserves increases 
the monetary base and ultimately the money supply. 
The model presented in Chapter III does not take into account 
the effect of the foreign trade sector due to its assumption of a 
c losed economy. In this chapter, the effect of foreign trade will be 
incorporated into the model in order to be able to capture more real-
istically the monetary process and its impact on the rate of 
inflation. 
The Model 
Equation (1), the demand for real per capita money balances, 
and equation (4), the relationship between the deficit rate and 
prices, have not been affected by exposing the model to the open 
economy assumption. However, equation (3) of the model now takes the 
following form: 
Bt = a + b6DCt + C6NFAt + e3t (3) 
where Bt is the monetary base in year t; 6DCt is the deficit at year 
. 2 t, NFAt is net foreign assets at year t; and a, b, and c are param-
eters, and both b and c are positive. Equation (2) of the model will 
not change. However, due to the existence of 6lnBt as one of the 
explanatory variables, it will be estimated again. In order to calcu-
late 6lnBt' the following relationship has been used: 
2Again, 6DC has been taken as a proxy variable for the rate of 
deficit . 
57 
t t 
B(-l) + a(t + 1) + b E 6DC . + C E 6NFA. 
i=O 1 i=O 1 
Therefore, the value of 6lnBt ir. the open economy model will be dif-
ferent than the one used in Cha pter III. Equation (2) is 
Now the complete model which describes the effect of both foreign 
trade and domestic policies upon inflation becomes : 
6ln(NP/M)t - Sy + a8( 6lnPt_1) + S(ln(M/N)t-l- lnPt-l) 
- qln(Y/N)t + q(l - S)ln( Y/ N)t-l + elt (1) 
6lnMt- 6lnMt-l = A(6lnBt- 6lnMt_1) + e2t 
6Bt = a + bOt + C6NFAt + e3t 
where 6NFAt is added to our list of exogenous variables . 
Empirical Results 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
This section reports the results of estimated parameters of 
equations (2) and (3) which have been affected by exposing the model 
to the open economy assumption . In estimating both equations , the 
two-stage least-squares method has been chosen as the appropriate 
estimation techniq ue. Tables 18 and 19 summarize the results. 
Exposing the model to the open economy assumption has increased 
the explanatory power of the equation. However, parameter for 
Argentina has been changed from being insignificant in the closed 
model to being significant in the open model. Equation (3) in the 
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TABLE 18 
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF SECOND EQUATION OF MODEL : OPEN ECONOMY 
Country A R2 ow 
Argentina 1.40* 0. 70 34 . 48 2. 15 
(0 . 24) 
(5 . 87) 
Bolivia 0. 10 0. 06 1. 56 2. 23 
(0. 08) 
(1.25) 
Brazil 0. 05 0. 03 0.62 2. so 
(0 . 06) 
(0.78) 
Colombia 0. 014 0. 02 0.52 2. 53 
(0.02 ) 
(0.72) 
Costa Rica -0 . 002 0.0007 0.002 3. 17 
(0 .06 ) 
(-0 . 04) 
Domini can Republic 0.82* 0.64 41 . 10 1.92 
(0 . 13) 
(6.41) 
Ecuador 0. 94* 0.63 39.92 1.80 
(0 . 15) 
(6 . 32) 
El Salvador 0.59* 0. 30 9. 63 1. 96 
(0 . 19 ) 
(3 . 10) 
Guatema la 0. 79* 0.65 41.97 1.74 
(0 . 12) 
(6 .48) 
Honduras 0.84* 0. 64 41.50 2.45 
(0 . 13) 
(6 .44) 
Venezuel a 0.48* 0. 36 13. 08 1. 87 
(D . 13) 
(3 .62 ) 
L 
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TABLE 19 
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THIRD EQUATION OF MODEL: OPEN ECONOMY 
Country Const . b c R2 DW 
Argentina 0. 18373E+06 0.80* 0.50* 0.98 407 . 75 1.88 
(98560 . 00) (0. 04) (0.07) 
(1 . 86) (22 . 04) (6 .83 ) 
Bolivia 109. 07 0. 58* 0.08 0. 71 31 .1 8 1. 47 
(100 . 66) (0 . 08) (0 . 10) 
(1. 08) (6 . 96) (0 . 77) 
Brazil 6040 . 30 1. 40* -0 . 55* 0. 93 159.30 0. 84 
( 3548. 80) (0 . 08) (0 . 14) 
(1 . 70) (17 . 22) (-3 . 95) 
Co l ombia 4785. 90* -2.02* 0.06 0. 95 212 . 20 2. 03 
(764.37) (0 .33 ) (0 . 09) 
(6 . 26) ( -6. 19) (0.68) 
Costa Rica 35 . 52 0. 75* -0.08 0. 66 23.87 3. 35 
(53 . 76) (0 . 12) (0 . 14) 
(0.60) (6 .44) (-0 . 56) 
Dominican 
Republic 4. 43 0. 68* 0.48* 0.26 4. 50 2.24 
(9 . 27) (0 . 29) (0 . 18) 
(0 . 48) (2 . 35) (2.63) 
Ecuador -251 . 02 2. 94* 0. 26* 0. 81 53 . 86 2. 75 
(223 . 80) (0 . 49) (0 . 11) 
( -1. 12) ( 5. 91) (2 . 35) 
El Salvador 19. 837 0. 47* o. 16 0. 36 6. 90 2. 19 
(12. 50) (0 . 13) (0 . 11) 
(1 . 59) (3 . 63) ( 1. 40) 
Guatemala 10. 16* 0.79* 0. 46* 0. 84 65 . 44 2. 53 
(3 . 70) (0 . 11) (0 . 05) 
(2. 75) (6.94) ( 10.05) 
Hondu ras 1. 53 1. 12* 0.42* 0. 80 49.95 2. 74 
(2. 52) (0 . 18) (0 . 05) 
(0. 61) (6 . 34) (7 . 28) 
Ve nezuela 976 . 48* 1. 13* o. 13* 0. 58 17 . 23 1.15 
(165 . 85) (0.24) (0 .04) 
(5 .88) (4 . 75) ( 3. 34) 
open economy model reveals some interesting results. Except for 
Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, and El Salvador, the coefficient of net 
foreign asset, i.e., C, is significant . Variation in monetary base is 
caused by not only deficits but also by net foreign assets. However, 
the weight of change in the domestic credit component in variation of 
the monetary base exceeds the net foreign asset component . 
The model presented in this chapter, though simple , helps to 
explain the monetary process in Latin American countries. Empirical 
results, even though different from country to country, suggest that 
both sources of the monetary base, that is, domestic credit component 
and foreign reserves, have been themain engine beh ind the increase in 
the money stock and eventually the rate of inflation. In a few 
countries where the estimated coefficient of these variables are not 
sign ifi cant, the variation in base money cou ld be attributed to either 
some structural changes in the country over time or to the ex i stence 
of mul ticolinearity between the domestic credit component and net 
foreign assets. Furthermore, whenever the coeffici ent of the monetary 
base is not sign ificant, i.e., the data does not show any relationship 
between the monetary base and the money stock, variation in the money 
stock could be explained in terms of changes in the money multiplier. 
The money multiplier for countries under study during 1950-80 is shown 
in Table 20 . In those countries in wh ich coefficients of both 
domestic credit component and foreign reserves are significant, 
without exception the magnitude of the domestic credit coefficient 
exceeds the foreign reserves coefficient . Thus, 
variation in the monetary base is domestic credit. 
the major source of 
In other words, 
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TABLE 20 
~10NEY MULTIPLIER (1950-80) 
= 
Argen- Boli- Bra- Col om- Costa Dominican Ecua- El Sal- Guate- Hondu- Vene-
Year tina via zil bia Rica Repub l ic dor vador mala ras zuela 
---------------- -----------
1950 0.67 1. 25 2.00 1. 50 1.65 1.42 1.26 1.27 1.15 1.6B 1. 33 
1951 0. 50 1. 20 1.80 2.00 1. 56 1. 35 1.25 1.27 1.15 1.73 1. 33 
1952 0. 80 1.10 1.67 1.63 1. 56 1.38 1. 24 1.31 1.11 1. 30 1. 39 
1953 0.67 1.07 1. 71 1. 70 1.55 1.34 1.25 1. 39 1.11 1.33 1. 46 
1954 0. 71 0. 96 1.67 1.69 1. 59 1. 21 1. 32 1. 45 1.11 1. 25 1. 50 
1955 0. 75 1.04 1. 80 1. 82 1. 63 1. 31 1. 28 1.45 1.15 1. 27 1.55 
1956 0.70 1.07 1.83 1.86 1.63 1.26 1. 30 1.49 1 . 14 1. 31 1. 54 
1957 1. 33 1.13 1.81 1. 84 1. 59 1.25 1. 29 1. 50 1.21 1. 32 1. 54 
195B 3.00 1.16 1. 84 1. 78 1. 59 1.44 1. 32 1.46 1. 25 1. 33 1.49 
1959 1. 42 1.11 1.92 1.86 1. 64 1.29 1. 33 1.42 1. 21 1.40 1. 56 
1960 1. 57 1.05 1. 86 1. 95 1. 57 1.22 1. 37 1. 40 1.19 1. 37 1.48 
1961 1. 71 1.06 1. 73 2.1 6 1. 57 1.41 1. 38 1. 32 1.13 1. 42 1.47 
1962 1. 67 1.10 1. 74 2. 66 1. 67 1. 31 1. 36 1.35 1.17 1. 44 1.61 
1963 1. 52 1.12 1. 67 2.03 1.68 1. 23 1.38 1.28 1.16 1.42 1. 53 
1964 1. 53 1.10 1. 68 1.87 1. 71 1.16 1. 36 1. 27 1.15 1.46 1. 67 
1965 1. 44 1.11 1. 76 1.82 1. 68 1.06 1.33 1.18 1.12 1. 51 1.72 
1966 1. 52 1.1 2 1. 61 1. 94 1. 71 0. 99 1. 34 1.18 1.08 1. 50 1. 71 
1967 1. 68 1.10 1. 83 1. 94 1.83 1.05 1.43 1.01 1.12 1.44 1. 74 
1968 1.62 1.12 1. 79 1. 71 1. 76 1.07 1.44 1. 02 1.21 1.43 1.67 
1969 1. 46 1.07 1. 78 1. 64 1.70 0. 95 1. 39 1.01 1.1 6 1.43 1. 75 
1970 1.45 1.08 1. 90 1. 64 1. 83 0. 98 1. 33 1.00 1.11 1.39 1.82 
1971 1.53 1.05 1.88 1. 63 1.85 0.94 1.35 0. 99 1.08 1. 37 1.70 
1972 1. 78 1.12 2. 16 1. 68 1. 74 1.00 1.30 0.99 1.01 1.47 1.81 
"' N 
TABLE 20 . Continued 
Argen- Bali- Bra- Col om- Costa Domin i can Ecua- El Sal- Guate- Hondu- Vene-
Year tina via zil bia Rica Republic dar vador ma la ras zuela 
------ ---------- - - - ---------------- -----
1973 0.56 l. 07 2. 13 1.68 1.84 0. 95 1.24 1.03 1.05 1. 52 1. 74 
1974 0. 59 1.16 2. 13 1.63 1.93 0. 89 l. 30 1.05 1.06 1.61 1. 80 
1975 0.62 1.09 2.29 l. 56 1.79 1.03 1.42 1.04 1.03 1.53 1. 91 
1976 0. 55 1.03 2.08 1. 49 1. 74 1.03 1. 39 1.05 0.95 1. 52 1. 82 
1977 0. 89 0. 99 1. 92 1. 38 1.48 0. 95 1. 52 1.05 1.00 1.47 1.88 
1978 1.06 0. 99 1. 90 1.15 1.85 0.92 1.44 1.19 1.02 1. 42 l. 97 
1979 1.40 1.05 1.77 1.11 1. 32 1.09 l. 43 l. 17 l. 07 1. 39 l. 91 
1980 l. 53 1.08 l. 92 1.10 1. 30 1.17 1.55 1.1 8 1.10 1. 53 2.08 
------
SOURCE : Computed from data present ed in Tables 1 and 8. 
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monetizing the deficit by borrowing from the central bank is mo re 
expansionary than an increase in balance-of-pa yment surplus . There-
fore, inflation is caused mostly by changes in the domestic credit 
component. Having a balance of payment in surplus cou ld ease the 
deficit financing of the country by use of the credit component. It 
has been argued that money creation domestically is a function of 
foreign reserves . That is, a country finances the deficit by borrow-
ing from the centra l bank if and on l y if the deficit exceeds the 
fore ign reserves or when the balance of payments is in deficit . But 
due to existence of a time lag (usually one year) to generate informa-
tion regarding balance of payments, deficits which occur during the 
year most l y are financed by borrowing from the central bank . Mean-
whi l e, if a country, in the same year, experiences a favorable balance 
of payments , the result will be a monetary base which exceeds the 
desired level. 
As already mentioned , devaluation he l ps a country in the short 
run in generating sufficient funds to offset its expenditures . How-
ever, in the long run, a fa vorable balance of payments due to devalua-
tion may become a major problem through the inflow of foreign reserves 
and , as a result, an increase in demand for importable goods and 
exhaustion of the country's foreign reserves. One way to ease this 
problem is investing in import substitute goods and cutting back the 
leve l of imports. 
Another problem which these countries are tied to is the dif-
ference between domestic and world prices. Due to their expansionary 
monetary policies, usual l y the domestic price exceeds the world price, 
causing an incentive to import or an increase in the demand for 
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importable goods. Since , by assumption, it is monetizing the deficit 
which causes an upward pressure in the price level, it is important to 
analyze the relationship between the price level and the deficit in 
order to be able to identify appropriate policy prescription. One way 
to analyze and understand the relationship between P and 0 is by 
conducting a causality test. This well-known test not only could help 
explain the process of money creation but also could help explicate 
the cases where equation (4) of the model has insufficien t explanatory 
power . 
Causality Between Deficit and Price 
In using equation (4) of the model, one has to know whether 
causality runs from deficit to prices or from prices to deficit. With 
the introduction of the notion of Granger-Causality (Granger 1969), it 
i s now argued that "tests for causality are indeed tests for 
exogeneity" (Greenberg and Webster 1983, p. 154) since the statistical 
properties of an exogenous variable are exactly those of a causality 
prior variable. 3 So a causa lity test of whether P causes 0 or 0 
causes P may throw some light on the model. 
One of the practical statistical tests of causa lity is the 
Granger test. 4 According to the definition of causality in a 
3Though on a philosophical ground , Zellner makes a distinction 
between causality and exogeneity; tests of causality yie ld some infor-
mation about exogeneity. 
4Among the three widely used tests of causality, viz ., Granger 
test, Sims test , and modified Sims test, the Granger test has been 
confidently recommended to the practitioner by Guikey and Salemi 
(1982) on the basis of thei r study of small sample performance tests 
for causa l ordering of bivariate time-series in the sense of Granger . 
bivariate time-series model given by Granger (1969 ) , D causes P if and 
only if P is better predicted by using the past history of D than by 
not doing so, with the past history of P being used in either case . 
The causa l ity runs from P to Din the like way if and onl y if D is 
better predicted by us i ng the past history of P than by not do ing so , 
with the past hi story of D being used in either case . 
There can be four possible cases . Fi r st , if D causes P and P 
does not cause D, it is said that causa l ity exists from D to P. 
Second , in the opposite case , if P causes D and D does not cause P, 
causa l ity exists from P to D. Third , if D does not cause P and P does 
no t causeD , P and Dare statistically independent . Fourth, if D 
causes D and P al so causes D, i t is said t hat feedback exists between 
P and D. 
As an alternative , Geweke (1982) suggests a test of the Granger 
def i nition which di rect ly utilizes ordinary l east-squares regression 
on l eve l s of ser ies . That is, to test causa li ty running from P to D, 
one can use the following specifications : 
p 
alD + E aljDt-j + elt 
J=l 
p p 
Dt = a20 + E a2j 0t-j + E b2kpt -k + e2t j=l k= l 
where e1t and e2t are residuals, a1j and a2j are parameters re l at i ng 
Dt and its lagged values and b2k are parameters relating Dt and past 
values of Pt . 
Similarly, to test causality running from D to P, the fo l lowing 
spec i fication can be used: 
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p I 
pt alO + 1: al/t-j +elt (1) j=l 
p I q I 
p = a20 + 1: a2/t-j + E b2k0t-k + elt (2) t j=l k=l 
The direct Granger test based on equations ( 1) and (2) is 
equivalent to testing the fo 11 owing null hypothesis: 
b21 = b22 = b2 = 0 
b 21 = b 22 = b 2 0 
which can be carried out with the following statistic: 
SS£ 1 - SS£2 / SS£ 2 
q ~ Nj: p - q - 1 
where SSE1 and SS£ 2 refer to the sum of squared residuals from ordi-
nary least-squares regressions on equations (1) and (2), respectively; 
and N is the number of time-series observat ions . Under the null 
hypothesis, is distributed as F with (q, N- p- q- 1) degrees of 
freedom. For suitably large values of f, reject t he hypothesis that p 
does not cause 0 using equations (1) and (2) 1 and 0 does not cause p 
I I 
using equations (1 ) and (2 ). A summary of tests for causal ity 
between 0 and p i s presented in Tabl es 21 through 31 for countries 
under study for the period of 1950-80. 
The results of the tests do, in fact, explain the shortcoming 
of equation (4) of the model in t he case of a few countries. In 
countries such as Argenti na, Brazi l, Bolivia , and Costa Rica, there is 
a strong feedback effect between the rates of deficit and inf l ation; 
that is, p affects 0 and 0 affects p. 
Number 
of 
Lags 
2 
Number 
of 
Lags 
2 
3 
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TABLE 21 
TEST OF CAUSA LITY BETWEEN D AND P IN ARGENTINA (1950- 80) 
For Causality from P to D 
Sum of Sguared Residuals Status of the Null 
In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
strained stra ined Test of no 
Equation Equation Statistic Causality 
• 456875E+ 14 • 0943375E+ 14 1 F18=70. 89 Rejected 
.462804E+14 .019613E+14 2 F15=169 . 47 Rejected 
.498508E+14 .00744719E+14 3 F12=215.42 Rejected 
For Causalit;t from D to P 
Sum of Sguared Residuals Status of the Nu 11 
In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
strained strained Test of no 
Equation Equation Statistic Causality 
.J97313E+07 • 4206T 1 F18=7.56 Rejected 
.28350E+07 308415 2 F15=61.44 Rejected 
. 254 78E+07 8813.78 3 F12=1152. 18 Rejected 
SOURCE: Computed from data presented in Tables 3 and 10. 
Number 
of 
Lags 
2 
Number 
of 
Lags 
2 
3 
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TABLE 22 
TEST OF CAUSALITY BETWEEN D AND P IN BOLIVIA (1950-80) 
For Causalit;:t from P to D 
Sum of Squared Residuals Status of the Nu 11 
In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
strained strained Test of no 
Equation Equation Statistic Causality 
. 275461E+08 • 181 1 63E+08 1 F26=13.53 Rejected 
. 1 20786E+08 .0876119E+08 2 F23=4.35 Rejected 
.661665E+07 • 315231 E+07 3 F20=7.33 Rejected 
For Causa 1 it;:t from D to P 
Sum of Squared Residuals Status of the Nu 11 
In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
strained strained Test of no 
Equation Equation Statistic Ca usality 
3175.80 2006 . 60 1 F26=15. 15 Rejected 
2910.24 935.107 2 F23=24.29 Rejected 
2597 . 48 896.280 3 F20=12.65 Rejected 
SOURCE : Computed from data presented in Tables 3 and 10. 
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TABLE 23 
TEST OF CAUSALITY BETWEEN D AND P IN BRAZIL (1950-80) 
For Causalit:t: from P to D 
Sum of Squared Residuals Status of the Nu 11 
Number In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
of strained strained Test of no 
Lags Equation Equation Statistic Causality 
.415923E+11 • 294546E+ 11 1 F26=10.71 Rejected 
2 • 399599E+ 11 . 042505E+ 11 2 F23=97.27 Rejected 
3 • 332939E+ 11 • 0321 089E+ 11 3 F20=62.46 Rejected 
For Causalit:t: from D to P 
Sum of Squared Residuals Status of the Null 
Number In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
of strained strained Test of no 
Lags Equation Equation Statistic Causality 
227620 13878. 3 1 F26=400.43 Rejected 
2 19754 2513 .48 2 F23=78.88 Rejected 
3 19739 729.841 3 F 20=173. 64 Rejected 
SOURCE: Computed from data presented in Tables 3 and 10. 
Number 
of 
Lags 
2 
Number 
of 
Lags 
2 
3 
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TABLE 24 
TEST OF CAUSALITY BETWEE N D AND P IN COLOMBIA ( 1950-80) 
For Causalit;t from P to D 
Sum of Squared Residuals Status of the Null 
In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
strained strained Test of no 
Equation Equation Stati stic Causa 1 ity 
• 185122E+10 • 116696E+10 1 F26=15.24 Rejected 
• 181929E+10 .0948359E+10 2 F23=10.57 Rejected 
• 163841E+10 . 0770386E+ 10 3 F20=7.52 Rejected 
For Causalit;t from D to P 
Sum of Squared Residuals Status of the Null 
In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
strained strained Test of no 
Equation Equation Statistic Causa 1 i ty 
31 1. 365 265.395 1 F26=4.50 Rejected 
310.443 261.163 2 Failed to F23=2. 17 reject 
291.216 259.696 3 Failed to F20=o.s1 
reject 
SOURCE: Computed from data presented in Tables 3 and 10. 
Number 
of 
Lags 
2 
3 
Number 
of 
Lags 
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TABLE 25 
TEST OF CAUSALITY BETWEEN D AND P IN COSTA RICA (1950-80) 
For Causalit;t from P to D 
Sum of Sguared Residuals Status of the Null 
In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
strained strained Test of no 
Equation Equation Statistic Causality 
.619323E+07 .453687E+07 1 F26=9.49 Rejected 
.615090E+07 .387337E+07 2 F23=6.76 Rejected 
.613768E+07 .22405E+07 3 F 20=1 1. 59 Rejected 
For Causa 1 it;t from D to P 
Sum of Sguared Residuals Status of the Nu 11 
In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
strained strained Test of no 
Equation Equation Statistic Causality 
504. 787 396.167 1 F26=7. 13 Rejected 
399.944 287.276 2 F23=4. 15 Rejected 
228.888 148.312 3 F20=3.62 Rejected 
SOURCE: Computed from data presented in Tables 3 and 10. 
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TABLE 26 
TEST OF CAUSALITY BETWEEN D AND P IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1950-80 ) 
Number 
of 
Lags 
2 
3 
Number 
of 
Lags 
2 
3 
SOURCE : 
Sum of Squared 
In Con-
strained 
Equation 
46124 .7 
43098 . 8 
42083 . 9 
Sum of Squared 
In Con-
strained 
Equation 
317.902 
304.514 
295 .716 
Computed from 
For Causalit;r: from P to D 
Residuals Status of the Null 
In Uncon- Hypothesis 
strained Test of no 
Equation Stati stic Causality 
25199.6 1 F26=21.6 Rejected 
20966.0 2 F23=12. 14 Rejected 
16103.1 3 F20=10. 76 Rejected 
For Causa 1 it;t from D to P 
Residuals Status of the Null 
In Uncon- Hypothesis 
strained Test of no 
Equation Statistic Causality 
305.002 1 Failed F26=1. 10 to 
reject 
286 .1 64 2 Failed F23=o. 74 to 
reject 
132.337 3 F20=8.23 Rejected 
data presented in Tables 3 and 10. 
Number 
of 
Lags 
2 
3 
Number 
of 
Lags 
2 
3 
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TABLE 27 
TEST OF CAUSALITY BETWEEN D AND P IN ECUADOR ( 1950-80) 
For Causalit;t from P to D 
Sum of Squared Residuals Status of the Null 
In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
strained strained Test of no 
Equation Equation Stat istic Causality 
.446846E+08 .371751E+08 1 F26=5.25 Rejected 
.225718E+08 . 112637E+08 2 F 23=11. 55 Rejected 
.217768E+08 .0879325E+08 3 F20=11.55 Rejected 
For Causalit;t from D to P 
Sum of Sguared Residuals Status of the Null 
In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
strained strained Test of no 
Equation Equation Statistic Causality 
145.075 144.768 1 Failed to F26=0.06 
reject 
115. 796 115.518 2 Failed to F 23=0. 03 reject 
109.868 83.5417 3 Failed to F20=2. 10 
reject 
SOURCE : Computed from data presented in Tables 3 and 10. 
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TABLE 28 
TEST OF CAUSALITY BETWEEN D AND P IN EL SALVADOR (1950-80) 
For Causality from P to D 
Sum of Squared Residuals Status of the Null 
Number In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
of strained strained Test of no 
Lags Equation Equation Statistic Causality 
425733 251891 1 F26=17.94 Rejected 
2 397097 168364 2 F23=15.62 Rejected 
3 306351 158128 3 F20=6.25 Rejected 
For Causalit;r: from D to P 
Sum of Squared Residuals Status of the Nu 11 
Number In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
of strained strained Test of no 
Lags Equation Equation Statistic Causa 1 ity 
257 . 462 247.259 1 Failed to F26=l.07 
reject 
2 243.216 211 . 883 2 Failed F23=1.70 to 
reject 
3 216.228 187 .441 3 Failed to F20=1D2.o 
reject 
SOURCE: Computed from data presented in Tables 3 and 10. 
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TABLE 29 
TEST OF CAUSALITY BETWEEN D AND P IN GUATEMALA (1950-80) 
For Causality from P to D 
Sum of Sguared Residuals Status of the Nul l 
Number In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
of strained strained Test of no 
Lags Equation Equation Statistic Causality 
62420 . 5 42445.6 1 F 26~12.24 Rejected 
2 62329 . 6 31410.1 2 F 23~11 . 32 Rejected 
3 45798. 9 16798.2 3 F 20~11.51 Rejected 
For Causal it;t from D to P 
Sum of Squared Residuals Status of the Nul l 
Number In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
of strained strained Test of no 
Lags Equation Equation Statistic Causality 
218. 253 216 . 149 1 Failed F 26~o.25 to 
reject 
2 145.762 133.076 2 Failed to F 23~1. 10 
reject 
140. 512 123.304 3 Failed F 20~o.93 to reject 
SOURCE: Computed from data presented in Tables 3 and 10. 
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TABLE 30 
TEST OF CAUSALITY BETWEEN D AND P IN HONDURAS (1950-80 ) 
For Causality from P to D 
Sum of Squared Residuals Status of the Null 
Number In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
of strained strained Test of no 
Lags Equation Equation Statistic Causality 
15228.7 12727.9 1 F26=5. 11 Rejected 
2 13483.1 11047.8 2 Failed to F23=2.53 
reject 
3 9827.89 8997.47 3 Failed F20=0.62 to 
reject 
For Causalit~ from D to P 
Sum of Squared Residuals Status of the Null 
Number In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
of strained strained Test of no 
Lags Equation Equation Statistic Causa 1 ity 
196.784 158. 586 1 F26=6.26 Rejected 
2 175. 625 117.343 2 F23=5.71 Rejected 
3 168.324 110.598 3 F20=3.48 Rejected 
SOURCE: Computed from data presented in Tables 3 and 10. 
Number 
of 
Lags 
2 
3 
Number 
of 
Lags 
2 
3 
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TABLE 31 
TE ST OF CAUSA LITY BETWEEN D AND P IN VENEZUELA (1 950-80 ) 
For Causalit;t from P to D 
Sum of Sguared Residuals Status of the Nu 11 
In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
strained strained Test of no 
Equation Equation Statistic Causa 1ity 
• 387968E+09 . 369053E+09 1 Failed F26=1.33 to 
reject 
• 384693E+09 . 335099E+09 2 Failed to F 23=1. 70 
reject 
. 363723E+09 • 322468E+09 3 Failed F20=0.85 to reject 
For Causa 1 it;t from D to P 
Sum of Squared Residuals Status of the Null 
In Con- In Uncon- Hypothesis 
strained strained Test of no 
Equation Equation Statistic Causality 
204 . 661 181.374 1 Failed to F26=3.34 
reject 
175.326 132.263 2 F23=3 . 74 Rejected 
125.597 105. 863 3 Failed to F 20=1. 24 reject 
SOURCE : Computed from data presented in Tables 3 and 10. 
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In Venezuela, the causality test does not show any relationship 
between D and p. In Guatemala, El Salvador, and Ecuador, causality 
runs from the rate of inflation to the deficit . In Colombia, the test 
shows feedback between p and D when the number of lags is one . As the 
number of lags increase, causality runs from p to D. Dominican Repub-
lie is different. Up to two lags has a causal effect, but for more 
than two l ags there is a feedback between price level and deficit . In 
the case of Honduras, the test shows feedback between D and p for one 
lag, but as the number of lags increases beyond one, the test shows 
causality from D to p. 
Except for Colombia, the results of the causality test corre-
spond with the statistical significance of our estimated coefficients 
in equation (4) of the model. When the coefficient of g1 is signif i -
cant, causality is shown to run from p to D, and when causality is 
from D to p, the estimated coefficient of the var i able is not signif i -
cant. The test of causality implies the self-generating nature of 
inflation for those countries in which strong feedback exists between 
p and D. 
The process implied when causality runs from D to p is that the 
country finances its deficit by borrowing from the central bank (if 
the change in foreign reserve is less than the rate of deficit) which 
causes an increase in the monetary base. An increase in the monetary 
base causes an increase in the money supply and ultimately an increase 
in the rate of inf l ation. Of course, a balance-of-payment surplus 
could ease the pressure on the monetary base . In those countries 
where causality runs from price level to deficit, the process can be 
explained in terms of an increase in government's annual expenditures 
BO 
due to an increase in the rate of inflation . When nominal expendi-
tures exceed government revenue, monetizing the deficit becomes 
unavoidable , and , therefore, the domestic credit component increases . 
As has already been mentioned, in countries where there exists 
a strong feedback between rate of inflation and deficit, self-
perpetuating inflation is implied. In those cases, an increase in the 
deficit is financed by borrowing from the central bank , which causes 
an increase in the monetary base . An increase in the monetary base 
increases the money stock and, ultimately, the rate of inflation . An 
increase in the rate of inflation has two effects: an increae in 
government expenditures, and an increase in the demand for importable 
goods . The cou ntry ' s reaction to these phenomena is, again, borrowing 
from the central bank to offset the deficit, and the process starts 
all over again. 
As seen from the emp i cal results , it is not possible in the 
context of this model to generalize regarding the self-generating 
nature of inflation in Latin America . In only a few countries from 
among those under study is the self-generating hypothesis supported . 
Therefore, it is the belief of the researcher that in some of the 
countries, factors other than those incorporated in the model, such as 
the capital account, might be causing the chronic rate of inflation in 
these countries, which is beyond the scope of the present study. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
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The argument that budget deficits are the main forces behind 
inflation has been widely accepted in economic literature. This study 
has tested the existing theory and has identified some shortcomings of 
that theory with the help of empirical data. The study is divided 
into three main parts. First, testing of the theory of the self-
generating nature of inflation in Latin America; second, testing the 
contribution of foreign trade to the monetary process; and third, 
testing for causality between the deficit and the rate of inflation. 
It is concluded that the government budget deficit plays an 
important role in determining the rate of inflation. Furthermore, the 
results from the open economy model suggest that it is not only the 
deficit which contributes to the rate of growth of the money supply 
and, ultimately, the price level but that the balance of payments and 
its variation also is a source of variation in the monetary base. 
However, it is important to note that the effect of an increase in the 
domestic credit component in order to finance the deficit is much more 
expansionary than is the effect of an increase in foreign revenues. 
Another important conclusion of this study is that no gener-
ality can be made regarding the rate of inflation and its sources with 
respect to Latin American countries. In some countries the source of 
variation is onl y the domestic credit component while in others it is 
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only foreign reserves. In most , both contribute . Therefore, it 
appears that a balance-of-payments surplus helps these countr ie s in 
two ways : ( 1) it eases the necessity of funding the deficit by bor-
rowing from the central bank, and (2) it causes an induction of the 
production of the domestically produced goods. This is accomplished 
when the balance-of-payments surp lus ca uses an increase in the income 
and this leads to an increase in the demand for both tradab le and 
nontradable goods which, in turn, induces production of domestically 
produced goods. 
It seems that the clos ed economy model explains fairly well 
inflation in a majority of countries tested . The results suggest that 
the major reason underlying ever-incresaing inflation is government's 
continuous borrowing from the central bank in order to offset its 
fiscal deficits. However, introducing net foreign assets to the 
second equation of the model (that is, exposing the model to the open 
economy assumption) increases both the explanatory power of the model 
and the F-statistics of the respective equations. 
The test of causa lity between deficit and price level reveals 
interesting implications . The test shows a strong feedback between 
these two variables for some countries. In others, causa lity exists 
from price to def i cit while in the remainder, causality runs from 
deficit to price. The causality test results support the statement 
a lready made that any generality regarding the self-generating nature 
of inflation in Latin America is wrong . Each of these economies 
suffer from inflation, but its extent and sources are different . 
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Policy Implications 
The analysis and results of this study lead to the following 
suggested policies designed to bring both deficit and inflation at 
least to moderate levels : 
1. Change in domestic component has been taken as the proxy for 
deficit . If change in base money is less than change in domes-
tic credit, it follows that a part of the deficit has been 
financed by drawing down foreign exchange reserves. In a 
simple case, government can finance part of its deficit by 
se lling gold to the public. This reduces money supply with the 
public and decreases the rate of inflation . Then as a policy 
prescription, it can be said that financing deficit by drawing 
down international reserves is contractionary. 
2. The avoidance of inflation in Latin America will depend mainly 
upon the elimination of government deficit financed by central 
bank credit. In most of these countries public utilities, 
transportation, etc . , are being subsidized by government. In 
order to reduce pressure on government expe nditure, these enti-
ties shou ld be required to charge actual full costs for serv-
ices in order to operate without subs idization . 
3. As above results suggest , financ i ng defic i t by borrowing from 
the central bank is much more expansionary than financing 
through foreign reserves . Therefore, an increase in the domes-
tic credit component for the purpose of financing government's 
deficit should be considered only as a l ast resort . 
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4. Excess demand for goods and serv ices as a result of too much 
money in the economy (actual money balances in excess of de-
sired level) could be eased by increasing the production of 
goods and services in the economy. In many Latin American 
countries, as in other underdeveloped countries, the economy 
operates well below its capacity. Therefore, production can be 
increased with minimum cost by simply utilizing the available 
resources. 
5. Since using domestic credit as a last resort requires a 
balance-of-payments surplus, policies directed to that, such as 
investing in import-substitute goods and export subsidies, 
should prove in reducing rates of inflation. 
6. In many developing countries, including Latin American ones, 
governments rely heavily on indirect taxes as a major source of 
revenue. This could be the reason their revenue falls short of 
their annual expenditures. Since variation in the domestic 
credit component comes from variation in budget deficits , and 
given the latter as the most significant source of 
(as this study suggests), the governments in these 
should formulate policies which insure balance 
budgets. 
inflation 
countries 
of their 
In conclusion, it should be noted that the stylized version of 
inflationary process as described above is an abstraction from reality 
in Latin American countries. A more elaborate model incorporating the 
capital account of balance of payments and/or making net foreign asset 
component of monetary base an endogenous variable might give a better 
explanation of the inflation process of these countries. 
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